What we learned from a year incubating longtermist entrepreneurship

By Rebecca Kagan, Jade Leung, Clifford @ 2021-08-30T08:39 (+199)

This post is a retrospective on the Longtermist Entrepreneurship (LE) Project, which ran for a year and explored ways to incubate new longtermist entrepreneurship. If you’re in a hurry, we recommend reading key lessons learned, what we’d be excited about, and what it takes to work in this space.

Thanks to Markus Anderljung, Aaron Gertler, Sam Hilton, Josh Jacobson and Jonas Vollmer for reviewing, as well as many others who reviewed an earlier draft of the document. All opinions and mistakes are our own.

Intro

The Longtermist Entrepreneurship (LE) Project ran from April 2020 through May 2021, with the aim of testing ways to support the creation of new longtermist nonprofits, companies, and projects. During that time, we did market sizing, user interviews, and ran three pilot programs on how to support longtermism entrepreneurship, including a fellowship. The LE Project was run by Jade Leung, Ben Clifford, and Rebecca Kagan, and funded by Open Philanthropy. The project shut down after a year because of staffing reasons, but also because of some uncertainty about the project’s direction and value.

We never had a public internet presence, so this may be the first time that many people on the EA Forum are hearing about our work. This post describes the history of the project, our pilot programs, and our lessons learned. It also describes what we’d support seeing in the future, and what our concerns are about this space, and ways to learn more.

Overall, we think that supporting longtermist entrepreneurship is important and promising work, and we expect people will continue to work in this space in the coming years. However, we aren't publishing this post because we want to encourage lots of people to start longtermist incubators. We think doing longtermist startup incubation is incredibly difficult, and requires specific backgrounds. We wanted to share what we’ve transparently and widely to help people learn from our successes and mistakes, and to think carefully about what future efforts should be made in this direction.

If you’re considering starting an LE incubator[1], we’d love to hear about it so we can offer advice and coordination with others interested in working in this space. Please fill out this google form if you’re interested in founding programs in LE incubation.

Key lessons learned:

Contents

Overview & motivation

The Longtermist Entrepreneurship Program ran for one year, with a team of 1-3 people throughout the year. It was supported by the Open Philanthropy project with an initial grant of $180,000 to Jade Leung in February 2020 and follow-on funding of $500,000 in September 2020. The EA Funds Long-Term Future Fund also made $200,000 available for pass-through grants to individual entrepreneurs, though the majority of this funding was not used. We were supported by the fiscal sponsorship of the Centre for Effective Altruism.

In total, $300,000 was spent on the LE Project so far, including staff time and passthrough grants.[2] A total of roughly 2 FTE’s staff time for one year was spent (24 months of full-time effort).[3]

Our high-level goal in this project was to create a robust ecosystem for longtermist entrepreneurship — which we define as the creation of new organizations and projects that are good for the long-term future of humanity (including projects in specific areas of longtermism like AI risk and bio, projects to increase civilization resilience, as well as some meta EA and meta longtermism projects). We define “robust ecosystem for LE” as a world in which high impact, risk-conscious longtermist organizations are started regularly to address key gaps in longtermism, and when the longtermist community is able to implement solutions at at least the pace it generates them. Some indicators of that ecosystem include:

Based on our personal experiences, and conversations with longtermist / EA community members, we believe that the LE ecosystem is not currently robust, and that this problem may not resolve on its own in the near future without the support of LE incubation programs. That’s why we were motivated to work on the LE Project.

The incubator shut down in May 2021, primarily for staffing reasons, but also because of some uncertainty about the value of the program on the part of one of the founders. One founder left in the fall of 2020 to pursue an unexpected job offer that they thought was higher impact. One decided to attend grad school, and the third wasn’t interested in being a solo founder. For the most part, these decisions were motivated by personal life circumstances, but it is possible that some or all of the founders would have stayed if the work had been more promising or tractable.

Pilot programs run

LE Survey

In June 2020, we sent out two surveys to assess the demand for longtermist entrepreneurship. We received >250 responses from people who identified as possible or current longtermist entrepreneurs, many of whom would be interested in participating in our programs. Over the year, we were also connected to ~100 other people who might be interested in doing longtermism entrepreneurship, both through word-of-mouth connections and 80,000 hours. We currently have a CRM of over 400 people who might be interested in LE.

Key takeaways:

Fall Fellowship

In the fall of 2020, we piloted a part-time 10-week fellowship for 10 longtermist entrepreneurs, some of whom formed co-founder pairs.

Fellows entered without being tied to specific ideas, and spent their time exploring and testing possible ideas, working an average of 16 hours/week. They received weekly coaching, all-hands structured meetings, resources on how to find and test ideas, connections to advisors, and optional peer coaching sessions. The program cost roughly $80k ($50k in staff time and $30k in fellow stipends) and took roughly 1,300 hours of staff and advisor time to run.

At the end of the fellowship, seven[5] groups pitched for up to $100k in seed funding. They were evaluated by Claire Zabel, Jonas Vollmer, Kit Harris and Sjir Hoeijmakers. Five of the seven groups applied for funding; two groups didn’t apply. Two groups were rejected; three groups received funding offers of varying amounts:

Key takeaways:

Matchmaking Pilot

In spring 2021, we ran a matchmaking pilot, aiming to match promising ideas with founding entrepreneurs. We picked 15 promising ideas from a list of previously generated promising startup ideas[6], and identified “idea patrons”: respected members of the EA community who would be useful advisors for the idea. We spoke with the idea patron about what was needed to get the idea started, headhunted promising entrepreneurs, and approached the entrepreneurs about their interest in starting the idea. Of the 15 ideas, only one reached the stage where the patron evaluated potential entrepreneurs. Others were suspended because patrons lost enthusiasm or the idea needed either a) more development or b) more follow-through / support than we felt we’d be able to provide (given that it wasn’t clear how long the incubator would be around for.)

Key takeaways:

There’s reason to think that future programming in this area would be promising. Ideas were available, patrons were enthusiastic, and entrepreneurs were receptive, however it would require more capacity to flesh out ideas and support entrepreneurs.

User Interviews

In early 2021, we conducted 40 in-depth user interviews with potential longtermist entrepreneurs, drawn primarily from the survey respondents + referrals. Our aim in user interviews was to see if there were common bottlenecks and needs among specific types of users. To do this analysis, we grouped talent by: track record of entrepreneurship, content expertise in an area of longtermism, and level of embeddedness within EA.

Key takeaways:

Bespoke Advising

In the summer of 2020, Jade provided support to three existing longtermist start-ups. Jade ran strategy sessions on theory of change, impact metrics, and community strategy. She also offered support with hiring, introduction to mentors, and coaching, which some of the organizations took. Participants rated the programs as very useful, although Jade decided not to continue the pilot because of concerns about scalability and impact.

Key takeaways:

Lessons learned

What we’d be excited about

We could imagine future programs would be valuable, provided they’re started by someone qualified (see more on this below). In particular, we’d be most excited to see:

Incubation aside, we also see the need for:

What we’d be concerned about

What plausible ideas probably shouldn’t exist in this space?

For any future longtermist entrepreneurship project, we’re particularly worried about the following two risks:

What it takes to work in this space

We think this space is particularly difficult to work in, and we expect there are very few people in the longtermist community with the right background and orientation to run incubators. In retrospect, we’re unsure we had the right background as a team to succeed, and think future team experience is important for success.

The right team to run another longtermist incubator would likely need to have:

Don’t get confused by the hype: In addition, we think it’s important that the founding team isn’t confused by the hype around LE incubation. The incubation space can seem particularly exciting relative to other possible LE orgs to start. We think this is a bit risky, and might lead people to work in the space who don’t have appropriate backgrounds, or are motivated by a false sense of excitement.

What next

We’re grateful for the support of Claire Zabel and the Open Philanthropy Project, the fiscal sponsorship of the Centre for Effective Altruism, and the numerous advisors, users, and program participants who were willing to give their time to us despite the roughness of our programs. We hope that the lessons learned from your time will continue to be valuable even though our program has ended.

If you’re considering starting an LE incubator[7], we’d love to hear about it so we can offer advice and coordination with others interested in working in this space. Please fill out this google form if you’re interested in founding programs in LE incubation. We’ll follow up with most people who express serious interest in starting an incubation program to offer connections and advice, and to learn more about your plans.

There are a few groups currently exploring doing work in this area. We haven’t closely evaluated any of their work, but if you’re interested in following similar work it might make sense to reach out to the following projects:

A longer retrospective on the incubator with private details is also available upon request, as well as many detailed retrospectives on our individual programs. Please reach out to imbenclifford@gmail.com if you think seeing these documents would be useful for your work.


  1. This survey is for people interested in incubation specifically, separate from “longtermist entrepreneurship” — namely, starting organizations that will help support multiple longtermist startups. Throughout this post, we use the phrase “LE Incubation” or “incubation” to refer to meta projects supporting the creation of more longtermist startups. ↩︎

  2. An additional $129,000 was earmarked for funding fellows, although we don’t expect all of it to be distributed. ↩︎

  3. This estimate doesn’t count participant time, including fellows, both during the programs and if funded afterwards. ↩︎

  4. This finding was mostly not supported by our user interviews, the majority of whom said they weren’t funding constrained. However, some users said they didn’t know how to access funding if they weren’t already well networked. This gave us a preliminary sense that, rather than being funding constrained, some users feel limited in their ability to access funding. Further exploration could be valuable. ↩︎

  5. Of the 10 participants, one dropped out (leaving nine fellows). Of the nine fellows, two sets formed co-founder pairs, leaving seven groups of founders (five individuals, two pairs). ↩︎

  6. Ideas were chosen from a previously compiled meta list of ideas, which pulled from several published and private lists of possible ideas. Most ideas were not carefully vetted, and had between one sentence and a few paragraphs of explanation. The 15 ideas were selected based on being potentially promising to implement now, having an “idea patron” and not requiring a huge amount of specific background knowledge either on the part of the incubation team or the founding entrepreneur. ↩︎

  7. Incubation specifically, separate from “longtermist entrepreneurship” — namely, starting organizations that will help support multiple longtermist startups. ↩︎


An1lam @ 2021-09-13T13:42 (+36)

Note: This message came out of a conversation with u/AppliedDivinityStudies and therefore contains a mix of opinions from the two of us, even though I use "I" throughout. All mistakes can be attributed to me (An1lam) though.

Really appreciate you all running this program and writing this up! That said, I disagree with a number of the conclusions in the write-up and worry that if neither I nor anyone else speak up with our criticisms, people will get the (in my opinion) wrong idea about bottlenecks to more longtermist entrepreneurship.


At a high level, many of my criticisms stem from my sense that the program didn't lean in to the "entrepreneurship" component that hard and as a result ended up looking a lot like typical EA activities (nothing wrong with typical EA activities). 


First, I strongly disagree with the implicit conclusion that fostering a LE requires lots of existing LE entrepreneurs, specifically:


Hundreds of people expressed interest in doing LE, but a very small number of these (1-3 dozen) had backgrounds in both longtermism and entrepreneurship. There were few people that we thought could pull off very ambitious projects.

And also:

Talent pool is larger than expected, but less senior.


If there existed a large pool of LE entrepreneurs with the right skills, there'd be a less pressing need for this sort of program.  I get that you're wary of analogies to tech startups due to downside risk but to the degree one wants to foster an ecosystem, taking a risk on at least some more junior people seems pretty necessary. Even within the EA ecosystem, my sense is that people who founded successful orgs often hadn't done this before. E.g., as far as I know Nick Bostrom hadn't founded an FHI 0.0 before founding the current instantiation of FHI. Same for GiveWell, CEA, etc. Given that, the notion that doing LE entrepreneurship requires "backgrounds in both longtermism and entrepeneurship" seems like too restrictive a filter.


Second, without examples it's a little hard to discuss, but I feel like the concern about downside risk is real but overblown. It's definitely an important difference between LE entrepeneurship and traditional startups to be mindful of but I question whether it's being used to justify an extreme form of the precautionary principle that says funders shouldn't fund ideas with downside risks instead of the, more reasonable IMO, principle of funding +EV things or trying to ensure the portfolio of projects has +EV. 


Third, I think some of the assumptions about what types of activities should take precedence for LE entrepreneurship deserve re-examining. As I alluded to above, it seems like the activities you say matter most for LE entrepeneurship, "research, strategic thinking, forecasting long-run consequences, and introspection [rather] than finding product-market fit" are suspiciously similar to "typical EA activities". From my perspective, it could instead be interesting to try and take some of the startup gospel around iteration, getting things out into the wild sooner rather than later, etc. seriously and adapt them to LE entrepreneurship rather than starting from the (appearance of the) assumption that you have very little to learn from that world. This isn't fully charitable, but I have the sense that EA has a lot of people who gravitate towards talking/strategizing/coordinating and getting other people to do things but sometimes shy away from "actually doing things" themselves. I view an LE entrepreneurship incubator as an opportunity to reward or push more people towards the "actually doing things" part. Part of this may also be that I'm a bit confused about where the boundary between normal and LE entrepreneurship lies. In my mind, SpaceX, fusion startups, psychedelics research would all qualify as examples of LE entrepreneurship with limited downside risk or at least not existential downside risks. Would you agree that these qualify as good examples?


Fourth, you mention advisors but only say a few by name. I'm 1) curious whether any of these advisors were experienced entrepreneurs and 2) interested in whether you considered getting advisors only adjacent to EA but very experienced entrepreneurs. As an example, at least one founder of Wave is an EA-aligned successful entrepreneurs who I can only imagine has wisdom to impart about entrepreneurship. I don't live in the Bay Area but I have the sense that there are quite a few other EA-adjacent founders there who might also be interested in advising a program like this.


Fifth, this is more low-level but I still don't really understand the skepticism of a YC-like incubator for LE entrepreneurship. It seems like your arguments boil down to 1) the current pool is small and 2) the requirements are different. But on 1, when YC started, the pool of entrepreneurs was smaller too! Such a program can help to increase the size of that pool. On 2, I agree that a literal copy of YC would have the issues you describe but I'd imagine a YC-like program blending the two community's thinking styles in a way that gets most of the benefits of each while avoiding the downsides. As an aside, we are also very supportive of longtermists doing YC but for slightly different reasons. This may also be related to the confusion about what qualifies as LEE.


Summarizing, my goal in writing this comment is not to just criticize the program. Instead, I worry that by highlighting the need for experience and the overwhelming risk of harm, the write-up as-is might discourage would-be LE entrepreneurs from trying something . I hope that my comment can help provide a counterweight to that.

Jonas Vollmer @ 2021-09-19T02:49 (+5)

FWIW, as someone who previously warned about risk of accidental harm, I personally mostly agree with this comment. I think what I care more is "option value to shut projects down if they turn out to be harmful" than preventing damage in the first place (with the exception of projects that have very large negative effects from the very beginning).

xccf @ 2021-09-23T06:09 (+2)

I think offering funding & advice causes more people to work with you, and the closer they are working with you, the larger the influence your opinion is likely to have on the question of whether they should shut down their project.

Jade Leung @ 2021-09-30T15:58 (+4)

Thanks for the comment An1lam, and apologies for the delay! Really appreciate the engagement. 

Some thoughts in response: 

On (1), I agree that fostering an ecosystem doesn’t require a load of experienced people; you’re very much right that that’s the whole problem that we’re trying to solve in the first place! What we mostly mean to say in terms of pointing to the lack of requisite experience is that we found that there weren’t that many individuals who are ready to hit the ground running with founding a substantial longtermist start-up right now; hence a lot of LE activities that we would have been excited about pursuing instead (and which are mentioned in the “what we’d be excited about” section) are targeted at making up for this lack of experience by e.g. fostering a community, bringing folks in-house in a foundry. 

On (2), as you say, it’s difficult to talk about this in the abstract, and certainly I feel sympathetic to the worry that we might be being too cautious (that was one of the motivations for me starting this project in the first place). With that said, I do think thinking thoroughly through downside risk considerations and treating them more seriously than is the norm among founders writ large is something that I want to encourage of all longtermist entrepreneurs, and I’d worry about not doing it enough more than I’d worry about doing it too much given what’s at stake. The thing that I’m interested in advocating for here, though, is something like demonstration of thought, care, and consideration, rather than avoiding projects with downside risk altogether (I think the two often are conflated); for example, if it turns out that after a reasonable amount of thinking there is some amount of downside risk, but the EV of the project is still high & the founder has identified reasonable things they could do to mitigate this downside risk, I (and I imagine most EA funders) would be supportive of that project going ahead.

On (3), seems right that EAs in general, and particularly folks trying to start new projects, have a fair amount that they could learn from ‘traditional’ start-up best practice (that was a big part of the framing that we took in designing curricula materials for the fellowship, for example). I’m not sure where we disagree here; I do also think that strategic thinking and introspection are important, and perhaps uniquely so for start-ups which don’t follow the usual product-fit dynamic (although I think several do, even something like a new research org), or where there are very slow feedback loops to use in the interim, hence why it might be unusually important for longtermist entrepreneurs to have this trait. But I don’t think thinking this is important is mutually exclusive to thinking that learning from more mainstream start-up practice is useful. 

On (4), advisors were a combination of experienced entrepreneurs (some of whom also happened to be quite engaged with EA, some less so) and domain experts. 

On (5), basically Jonas’ comment captures the main thing - that given our epistemic state in longtermist cause areas at the moment, it just seems quite difficult to come up with start-up ideas that fit the typical YC model (find product-market fit, then scale), which means that the idea generation process I think needs to be quite a bit more involved, be advised by domain experts, etc. and the build-iterate cycle necessarily needs to be tweaked from the usual dynamic expected for e.g. software products. I.e. mostly leaning on (2) of ‘the requirements are different’ rather than the pool being small. 

Two additional high level things that come to mind in response: 

1 - We definitely don't want to discourage promising longtermist entrepreneurs who are excited about starting something in this space, the intent was to clarify for future potential incubator founders what we tried and learned. 

2 - In terms of your overall concern that the program wasn't entrepreneurial enough, it's a bit hard to comment. At the end of the day, we do think that simply replicating traditional entrepreneurship in this space won't quite work, but also do think that the EA community could learn a ton from the entrepreneurship community (and designed our program with both of those in mind). It's possible you disagree, or possible that the tone and seriousness with which we centered entrepreneurship didn't come through in this post. 

An1lam @ 2021-10-03T19:08 (+3)

Hey Jade,

Thanks so much for your reply. This actually really helped clarify things for me. I think we may still have some different priors about (2) but overall your comment made me think we agree much more than we disagree (and than I'd previously thought we'd disagreed). 

I again just want to note that I'm grateful you ran the program and engaged so productively with my comment.

Jade Leung @ 2021-10-08T00:21 (+2)

Really glad to hear, and in turn, really appreciate your engagement with the post! 

Jonas Vollmer @ 2021-09-19T02:53 (+3)

Regarding a YC incubator model, I think the main issue is just that people rarely generate sufficiently well-targeted and ambitious startup ideas. I really don't think we need another dozen donation apps or fundraising orgs, but that's what people often come up with. I think we'd want something that does more to help people develop better ideas. (Perhaps that's what you had in mind as well.)

An1lam @ 2021-09-19T03:45 (+1)

Honestly I wasn't too sure what the biggest issue was but what you described seems reasonable to me! 

imben @ 2021-10-01T08:20 (+2)

A quick thought  on having a YC-style programme and taking risks on more junior talent:

Domain expertise is important - I think YC would agree on this. If taking on a deep tech startup they would look for someone on the team who had domain expertise in the field.

I think early YC Internet startups like Dropbox or Airbnb make it look like domain expertise is less important and it’s more about just getting stuck in. The difference is that when Dropbox started there was no expert in “files on the internet” so the founders could basically become the world experts just by getting stuck in and working on it.

The difference with Longtermist areas like AI and Bio is you can’t just become the expert by working on it and (yes, you guessed it) the downside risk means we don’t want to take bets on people to just go for it and try it out (unlike Dropbox where it doesn’t really matter if it fails catastrophically).

Michael_S @ 2021-08-30T17:49 (+14)

Very interesting, valuable, and  thorough overview!

I notice you mentioned providing grants of 30k and 16k that were or are likely to be turned down. Do you think this might have been due to the amounts of funding? Might levels of funding an order of magnitude higher have caused a change in preferences? 

Given the amount of funding in longtermist EA, if a project is valuable, I wonder if amounts closer to that level might be warranted. Obviously the project only had 300k in funding, so that level of funding might not have been practical here.  However, from the perspective of EA longtermist funding as a whole, routinely giving away this level of funding for projects would be practical.
 

Rebecca Kagan @ 2021-09-01T02:45 (+3)

Hey Michael! I don’t know if more money would have changed their decisions, but I want to clarify that the funding panel wasn’t funding constrained (we actually had more than $300k set aside for this), and funders didn’t make the decision with that as a limitation.

The cases aren’t actually that similar — in one, the funding panel gave a low amount to discourage the individual from pursuing the idea and support a career transition, in the other they gave the individuals more than requested — but in both cases the uncertainty of what the people would do was the key cause in giving a relatively small amount of money, not being funding constrained.

Michael_S @ 2021-09-01T11:57 (+7)

If you don't want someone to do something,  makes sense not to offer a large amount of $. For the second case, I'm a bit confused by this statement:

"the uncertainty of what the people would do was the key cause in giving a relatively small amount of money"

What do you mean here? That you were uncertain in which path was best?
 

Rebecca Kagan @ 2021-09-01T22:21 (+1)

"the uncertainty of what the people would do" -->

Both groups were being funded for open-ended plans (in one case, a career transition, in the other "exploring EA field-building"), rather than a specific venture, hence the uncertainty.

"If you don't want someone to do something" -->

This isn't the case -- if the funders hadn't wanted the recipients to move forward, they wouldn't have given funding. In that case, the funder offered to support a different plan than the one that was originally pitched, namely instead of a venture, a career transition.

vaishnav @ 2021-08-30T22:29 (+9)

Given the constraints highlighted above, It seems like a venture builder model (focussed on a specific cause area) may be more effective, wherein the following process is repeated:

 (1) Generate plausible venture ideas from existing research within EA orgs

(2) Analyze ideas on two dimensions - (a) Cost benefit Analysis (b) Operational feasibility

(3) Incubate and recruit EA aligned technical and non technical co-founders (who then build their own team)

(4) Tie further funding and possibly  bonuses to specific short term milestones

 

Everything above is of course contingent on the ability to actually generate actionable ideas that pass Step 2(a) in a particular cause area. 

hrosspet @ 2021-09-02T17:07 (+7)

Very interesting read, thanks for publishing this!

I am curious what qualified as "having longtermist experience" for you?

imben @ 2021-10-01T08:21 (+2)

Glad to hear!

Roughly this would mean having worked in a relevant area (e.g. bio, AI safety) for at least 1 - 2 years and able to contribute in some capacity to that field. To be clear, some ideas would require a lot more experience - this is just a rough proxy.

rory_greig @ 2021-09-06T11:38 (+4)

Is there a list of the ideas that the fellows were working on? I'd be curious. 

It's not surprising to me that there aren't many "product focused" traditional startup style ideas in the longtermist space, but what does that leave? Are most of the potential organisations research focused? Or are there some other classes of organisation that could be founded? (Maybe this is a lack of imagination on my part!)

imben @ 2021-10-01T08:22 (+4)

Hi Rory, thanks for the comment! We haven’t published those ideas. In terms of classes of organisation, one way to carve up the space is to think about Object-level and Meta-level approaches to generating ideas.

Object-level approaches focus on doing direct work to solve the problem at hand. For example:

  • developing and deploying technologies
  • conducting research
  • advocating for policy change

The main type of impact here comes in the form of tangible changes in actions taken in the real world, in whatever form that might take.

Meta-level approaches focus on improving the capacity for others to solve the problem. This can be done on the EA/longtermist wide-level (building up the movements) or in a specific domain, e.g. building a talent pipeline specifically for bio policy experts. Concrete types of meta work include, for example:

  • community and field building
  • the dissemination of ideas and knowledge and values
  • increasing the resources available to work on object-level approaches

The main type of impact here comes in the form of the change in likelihood that object-level approaches will be impactful.

Hope that's useful!

Minh Nguyen @ 2023-10-07T23:04 (+3)

I just discovered this thread, but figured I'd back up some data points! I've been in the EA community since 2016-ish and done entrepreneurship and longtermist work for about 2 years. I won't lean too much into my experience, I'll generally say things other entrepreneurs and impact-minded people would agree with.

Re: Founder pool

The talent pool size is much smaller (only 100s of potential longtermist entrepreneurs in total vs tens of thousands of entrepreneurs).

It is helpful to think of "longtermism" and "entrepreneurship" as two entirely distinct, and very uncommon skillsets/mental frameworks. Currently, way less than 1% of the world would identify as longtermist, and less than 1% would identify as entrepreneurs. While these traits are slightly correlated, the vast majority of lontermists are not entrepreneurs, and the vast majority of entrepreneurs are not longtermist.

That's totally fine, but makes things difficult for a longtermist incubator. I mean, if Y Combinator started prioritising longtermist involvement, I'm pretty sure they'd have similar challenges.

Re: Project pool

We found almost no longtermist ideas for traditional startup-minded people to pursue (product-based with quick path to scale, feedback loops), and don’t expect this will be the majority of promising longtermist startups.

Again, overlap is hard. One thing Y Combinator constantly emphasises is that most startups never achieve product-market fit. I.e. it's really, really hard to build something people want to pay for. So the reliable solution is to try and iterate a lot with fairly little information. A 10% success rate is really good if you try a dozen times a month.

So just building anything successful is hard. Then you have to try and make something impactful, which is another, completely separate hard thing to do. Most successful, lucrative companies are not "effective" or "impactful" in the longtermist sense. I've tried this thought exercise myself, sometimes I would think of/test like 9 potential lucrative startup ideas before I find one that's lucrative and also possibly impactful.

Anyway, point is: This is a difficult thing to do, essentially trying to find a very narrow eligible pool and get them to work on a very small set of possible ideas. I really appreciate that this was tried!

ryan_b @ 2021-09-03T19:32 (+3)

I'd be interested to hear more about the thoughts behind this key lesson:

The LE Project should be divided into several different organizations/efforts, rather than one incubator.

This makes sense to me in light of the different tasks and operational requirements that different purposes are likely to require, but I noticed a theme running through the rest of the report of uncertainty. This included things like funders being uncertain of downside risk; uncertainty about what actions a person with funding should take; an expertise/experience bottleneck for longtermism and especially the combination of longtermism and entrepreneurship.

What do you think of the relationship between the constraints and having multiple orgs in the space?

imben @ 2021-10-01T08:32 (+1)

Hi Ryan, I may be misunderstanding the question so correct me if I'm wrong - are you saying something like: "given that there's lots of uncertainty about what's needed this seems in tension with starting an organisation that concentrates on only one user type (e.g. recent generalist graduate) or one domain (e.g. AI Safety)"?

Davidmanheim @ 2021-09-01T08:23 (+3)

Is the slack or other community  resources still being used / are they still available for additional people to join?

Josh Jacobson @ 2021-09-02T05:58 (+1)

The Slack used for the fellowship is no longer being used

Jamie_Harris @ 2021-09-11T07:11 (+2)

There are very few people with longtermist & entrepreneurial experience (e.g., 2-3 years experience in both) that we trust to execute ambitious projects in specific areas of longtermism (bio, AI, etc.).

 

Do you have any reflections or recommendations about what people who meet one but not both of these criteria could be doing to become great potential LEs? I appreciate that there is an obvious answer along the lines of "try the other one out!" but I'm wondering if you have any specific suggestions beyond that.

I.e. 

What could people with longtermist experience but negligible entrepreneurship experience be doing to bridge that gap? Are there any specific resources (books, articles, courses, internships, etc) you'd recommend for people to start testing their personal fit with this and building relevant skills?

And the same question again for people with entrepreneurship experience but negligible longtermist experience.

(Further also to hrosspet's question, I'd be interested in roughly how you were defining/conceptualising those two categories, and if you have general comments about the ways in which people tended to insufficiently developed in one or the other.)

Jamie_Harris @ 2021-09-11T07:04 (+2)

Thanks for this post. It's great to see the writeup to be able to learn from the experience, even though it didn't work out for you guys in this iteration of the idea.

I sense a slight potential tension between the comment that "EA operations generalists, often with community-builder backgrounds, who would be interested in working on EA meta projects" seem like a promising group to work with and the comment that "There are very few people with longtermist & entrepreneurial experience (e.g., 2-3 years experience in both) that we trust to execute ambitious projects in specific areas of longtermism (bio, AI, etc.)." I would imagine that the former group would tend to not have much experience in "specific areas of longtermism". I'd love any clarity you can shed on this:

imben @ 2021-10-01T08:19 (+3)

Hey Jamie - Ben Clifford here, thanks for flagging this.

I think your second bullet captures the idea well. I don’t think being good at EA community building and associated ideas requires deep domain expertise in areas like AI or Bio.

There would be an argument for thinking about bullet 3 as well but it wasn’t what I was thinking.

aman-patel @ 2021-09-26T18:31 (+1)

Thanks for this post! Reading through these lessons has been really informative. I have a few more questions that I'd love to hear your thinking on:

1) Why did you choose to run the fellowship as a part-time rather than full-time program?

2) Are there any particular reasons why fellowship participants tended to pursue non-venture projects?

3) Throughout your efforts, were you optimizing for project success or project volume, or were you instead focused on gathering data on the incubator space?

4) Do you consider the longtermist incubation space to be distinct from the x-risk reduction incubation space?

5) Was there a reason you didn't have a public online presence, or was it just not a priority?

imben @ 2021-10-01T08:24 (+2)

Thanks, great questions! In response: 

1) How come you choose to run the fellowship as a part-time rather than full-time program?

We wanted to test some version of this quickly, part time meant:

  • It was easier to get a cohort of people to commit at short notice as they could participate alongside other commitments
  • We could deliver a reasonable quality stripped back programme in a short space of time and had more capacity to test other ideas at the same time

With that said, if we were to run it again, we almost certainly would have explored running a full-time program for the next iteration. 

2) Are there any particular reasons why fellowship participants tended to pursue non-venture projects?

Do you mean non-profits rather than for-profits? If so, I think this is because nonprofits present the most obvious neglected opportunities for doing good. Participants did consider some for profit ideas.

3) Throughout your efforts, were you optimizing for project success or project volume, or were you instead focused on gathering data on the incubator space?

The latter - we were trying to learn rather than optimise for early success.

4) Do you consider the longtermist incubation space to be distinct from the x-risk reduction incubation space?

Yes, mostly insofar as the Longtermist space is broader than the x-risk space - there are ideas that might help the long term future or reduce s-risk without reducing x-risk.

5) Was there a reason you didn't have a public online presence?

I think having an online presence that is careful about how this work is described (e.g. not overhyping entrepreneurship or encouraging any particular version of it) is important and therefore quite a bit of work. We felt we could be productive without one for the time we were working on the project so decided to deprioritise it. If we had continued to work on the project, we would have spent time on this.