Not giving up: early career papers

By SofiiaF @ 2025-01-01T23:21 (+1)

This is a linkpost to https://sofiiabioblog.blogspot.com/2024/12/introductions-citations-and.html

As I was rewriting my introduction for the eighteenth time, I couldn't stop thinking 

''My skills in writing biological papers are severely lacking, I'm so bad at this''

and that can definitely be seen by comparing any article or paper I read to mine. However, with the thought circling round again and again, I decided to try reframing it.

I keep telling myself with every word I write, we all start somewhere.

Sometimes I forget the finished product I am reading in a highly acclaimed journal is probably the result of years of experience, failures, successes, tries, drafts and blank documents.

I suppose we all sometimes fall into the trap of 'I'm bad at this' and 'I can't do this' or 'I'm not good at this'. But I've also found that the trap can be broken if we try. It may be slow, but for me, I like using the word 'yet'.

'I can't do this.... yet' but I will be able to one day

'I'm not good at this... yet' but I will be

'I don't know... yet' but I will learn

Everyone reading this one day could barely put together a two syllable word, or take a step, or read the title of a book, or say a full sentence. One day, I thought I would never grasp capital letters. Those days may be over a decade behind me, and yet I have decades left to go. Could you imagine if you'd given up before? 

I can bet that you reading this (yes, you!), have faced a time you thought something would never be possible, that you weren't good enough. I definitely have. And comparing ourselves to someone who has already surpassed us in one domain can be dejecting, and yet perhaps we can reframe it. 

This person probably had the same feelings one day, this person probably can't do something that I can, this person also started somewhere. I may be lacking this skill, but if I told my self 5 years younger what I can do today, would they be proud?

I know I have so many more dreams of what I want to achieve, but to 5 year old me, she would be so proud, she would be so happy, she would be awe-struck- by what I've already achieved.

Perhaps next time you want to give up, or you feel not good enough, maybe try telling your younger self what you already can do?

Some other tips to reframe this that I found helpful:

So, speaking of accepting imperfections, here is my finished introduction. I'm still not happy with it, and yet I don't think I will ever be. But I will try. And the first one will be bad, but my next paper introduction will be less bad, and who knows maybe one day I'll have a paper that can have an impact:


Copy and Paste: exploiting vaccine templates

Template Vaccination and the likelihood of narrow-use countermeasure exploitation in Biosecurity by malicious actors.

Keywords: Global Catastrophic Biorisk, Narrow scope countermeasures, broad scope, template vaccination, malicious actor biological threats, bioweaponry

Abstract:

The potential for template vaccines to be purposefully exploited by malicious threat actors as a premise in biosecurity is a vital consideration in how effective they may be as a broad scope countermeasure to biological threats and extinction risks from malicious, accidental or natural risks from biological agents. 


 

Index:

Introduction

Template Vaccination

Cat and mouse defence

Expert opinion

Conclusion

 


 

Introduction:

Biological threats- whether naturally occurring or human engineered- have existed as long as life itself. From tragically lethal global pandemics such as the Black Death (estimated death toll from 70-200 million), or current threats such as Malaria or recent emergences such as Sars-Cov-2, the mainstream view of pandemic protection is an idea of specific vaccination or medication efforts. 

However, some threat profiles suggest that we cannot anticipate a particular pathogen as a potential existential risk in time, nor can we constantly generate specific protection measures for each candidate. The stance I am exploring is the proposed pathogen agnostic idea of broad scope vaccine templates that may be used irrespective of which communicable disease (or its origin) is spreading, to quickly prevent and mitigate infection. The idea of Global Catastrophic BioRisks (GCBRs, of civilization infrastructure or humanity having a poor chance of survival after an extreme event due to biological agents) being better reduced by these broad measures has been highly evidences in biosecurity circles, but is not the focus of media coverage or popular science strategies that deal more with specific agents.

A landscape of continually emerging threats that are either naturally, maliciously or accidentally released into human and animal populations can render specific efforts slow, costly and easily abused. For example, natural mutation of strains of Tuberculosis or Covid-19 can cause false negatives on binary testing, and vaccines for certain diseases can be evaded due to genetic shift or malicious engineering of the pathogen (such as H5N1 instances). The idea that narrow countermeasures also are an easily exploitable avenue for offensive weaponry can be mirrored in many strategies. For example, working on a specific mutational change for a known vaccine, working on a different pathogen once a select vaccine has been made for a previous bioweapon (such as Soviet bioweapon programs switching from Smallpox to Anthrax), or simply the time it takes to identify and recognise a new emergence when clinical symptom patterns of an already affected patient population is our metric for investigation.

Broad scope countermeasures instead attempt to deal with less easily exploited avenues, from the ‘science fiction esque’ idea of bunkers or surveillance systems, to the more mundane policy changes or technological advancements, the idea of attempting to create a social, scientific and medical environment resilient at identifying, preventing and mitigating any infectious agent has seemed like a distant dream for most of humanity.

However, with recent advances in many technologies, and empirical evidence in early trials pointing to its effectiveness, some traction has been gained in support for these measures. From physical interventions (that are harder to engineer evasion to) such as ventilation systems, sterilisation, or PPE, to systems of genomic sequencing in wastewater to establish spikes from baselines to identify novel pathogens or mutations rather than waiting for clinical evidence clusters, have already shown great promise in increasing speed, understanding and intensity of novel biological threat response.

However, the eye of vaccine organisations has been wandering towards the idea of a universal template vaccine as the best way to curb an outbreak and quickly build immunity to any agent. Instead of traditional vaccines that tend to favour heavy changes between agents that themselves are attenuated (weakened or killed) and uniquely made safe (with long trials), the focus has shifted to a ‘template’ of viral or bacterial genomic vectors that can then have antigens or instructions for antigens (antigens are like a signalling coat for any biological molecule and are what allows the immune system to identify threats) inserted in quick alterations to provide safe and speedy personalised and novel vaccines (without the need for specific trials for every alteration). 

This has many benefits such as reduced response times between identifying a pathogen to providing immunity, a potential to provide personalised vaccines in areas with new mutations to prevent new strain spread, and even reduces risks of severe illness as the actual pathogen cannot cause illness, since only the signalling antigen is either inserted or coded for, and the body can respond without a fear of an active overpowerment. 

The vector templates can also be premade and stockpiled, and seem an attractive option to reduce biological threats. However, template vaccines may have their own avenues of exploitation by threat actors that could potentially be more grave than any single narrow scope measure.