Orienting to 3 year AGI timelines

By Nikola @ 2024-12-22T23:07 (+121)

My median expectation is that AGI[1] will be created 3 years from now. This has implications on how to behave, and I will share some useful thoughts I and others have had on how to orient to short timelines.

I’ve led multiple small workshops on orienting to short AGI timelines and compiled the wisdom of around 50 participants (but mostly my thoughts) here. I’ve also participated in multiple short-timelines AGI wargames and co-led one wargame.

This post will assume median AGI timelines of 2027 and will not spend time arguing for this point. Instead, I focus on what the implications of 3 year timelines would be. 

I didn’t update much on o3 (as my timelines were already short) but I imagine some readers did and might feel disoriented now. I hope this post can help those people and others in thinking about how to plan for 3 year AGI timelines.

The outline of this post is:

A story for a 3 year AGI timeline

By the end of June 2025, SWE-bench is around 85%, RE-bench at human budget is around 1.1, beating the 70th percentile 8-hour human score. By the end of 2025, AI assistants can competently do most 2-hour real-world software engineering tasks. Whenever employees at AGI companies want to make a small PR or write up a small data analysis pipeline, they ask their AI assistant first. The assistant writes or modifies multiple interacting files with no errors most of the time. 

Benchmark predictions under 3 year timelines. A lot of the reason OSWorld and CyBench aren’t higher is because I’m not sure if people will report the results on those benchmarks. I don’t think things actually turning out this way would be strong evidence for 3 year timelines given the large disconnect between benchmark results and real world effects.

By the end of 2026, AI agents are competently doing multi-day coding tasks. The employees at AGI companies are thoroughly freaked out and expect that AI which can beat humans at 95% of virtual jobs is probably going to be created within 2 years. They also expect that superintelligence will follow soon after. The government realizes that AI will be decisive for national power and locks down the AGI companies in late 2026. This takes the form of extreme government oversight bordering on nationalization. Progress stays at a similar pace because of the race with other nuclear weapons states. 

Starting in 2027, most of the company’s quality-weighed workforce is made up by AI agents. The main decisions made by leadership are about allocating their workforce of millions of agents to various research areas, including AI R&D, safety, commercial applications, military applications, cyber, operations, communications, policy work, and most other types of work done on computers at the company. The human employees don’t matter much at this point except to attempt to help answer questions for groups of AI agents that get stuck and want a second opinion on their work.

AGI is created by the end of 2027. History probably doesn’t end here, but I will not go describe the post-AGI world in this post for brevity.

Important variables based on the year

Note that there’s a significant shift in dynamics in the middle of the story, which also imply significant shifts in the strategic landscape.

The pre-automation era (2025-2026). 

In 2025 and 2026, humans are still doing most of the work. Most important questions center about allocations of humans and commercial and regulatory pressures placed on AI labs and the rest of the supply chain. 

In the pre-automation era, humanity’s main priority should be very quickly finding safe ways to delegate research to AI agents. The main reason to do any type of safety-oriented research is to control these precursor agents who will later continue the research. 

Another priority of the pre-automation era is finding ways to tell whether our current safety interventions will be adequate to prevent large numbers of AI agents from scheming or doing other undesirable things. Part of this is also setting up systems to pause and convince others to pause in case an adequate safety case can’t be made. This will get harder as the race heats up.

The post-automation era (2027 onward). 

After 2026, AIs are doing most of the work. At this point, the research is mostly out of human hands, but the human employees are still involved in high-level decisions and interfacing with humans outside the AGI company. By the end of 2028, humans can no longer contribute to technical aspects of the research.

The main questions center around the allocation of AI agents, and their mandated priorities. Some important questions about this period are:

  1. How good is the broad research plan that the AI agents are pursuing?
    • For example, if the human in charge of initially scoping out the research direction is someone who is fundamentally confused about AI safety, the hopes of aligning models might be doomed despite an initially well-meaning population of AI agents.
  2. How many company resources are invested in safety-oriented research?
    • Allocating 0.1% of compute vs 25% of compute to safety might make a large difference in the success of the safety work that is done.

Important players

Note that "The AI Safety Community" is not part of this list. I think external people without much capital (fiancial, social,  intellectual, or other kinds) just won't have that much leverage over what happens.

Prerequisites for humanity’s survival which are currently unmet

This is not meant to be an exhaustive list.

  1. A sensible takeoff plan. Currently, AGI companies lack a vision for how to navigate safely handing off research to AI agents.
    1. The alignment approach - companies don’t have (public) default plans for which research areas to assign to their population of AI agents by default.
    2. Compute commitments - even with a sensible alignment approach, a lack of commitments might lead to an inadequate proportion of AI agents and compute to be allocated to it.
    3. Frontier safety frameworks - the requirements and commitments around SL-4 and SL-5 are currently very unclear, allowing a lot of wiggle room to cut corners during takeoff.
    4. Control - the science of safely handing off work to AI agents (or being able to tell that it’s not safe to do so) is very underdeveloped.
  2. State-proof cybersecurity. If bad actors can steal the weights of very advanced AI systems, things become extremely unpredictable due to misuse and enabling less careful entities to create advanced AI.
  3. A way to survive global tensions. The creation of AGI will disrupt the balance of military power between countries, possibly giving one entity a decisive strategic advantage. I think the probability of nuclear war in the next 10 years is around 15%. This is mostly due to the extreme tensions that will occur during takeoff by default. Finding ways to avoid nuclear war is important.
    1. During the cold war, there were multiple nuclear close calls that brought us close to annihilation. Some of these were a consequence of shifts in the strategic balance (e.g. the Cuban Missile Crisis). The US threatened the USSR with nuclear war over the Berlin Blockade. The creation of superintelligence will make these events seem trivial in comparison, and the question is just whether officials will realize this.
  4. Doing nationalization right.
    1. Getting the timing right. If nationalization happens too late (e.g. after AGI), the ensuing confusion and rapid change within the project might lead to bad decision making.
    2. Creating default plans. There will likely be a time in 2025 or 2026 that will be marked by significant political will to lock down the labs. If there don’t already exist any good default plans or roadmaps on how to do this, the plan will likely be suboptimal in many ways and written by people without the relevant expertise.
    3. Building political capital. Unless people with relevant expertise are well-known to important actors, the people appointed to lead the project will likely lack the relevant expertise.
    4. Keeping safety expertise through nationalization. A nationalization push which ousts all AI safety experts from the project will likely end up with the project lacking the technical expertise to make their models sufficiently safe. Decisions about which personnel the nationalized project will inherit will likely largely depend on how safety-sympathetic the leadership and the capabilities-focused staff are, which largely depends on building common knowledge about safety concerns.

Robustly good actions

Final thoughts

I know it can be stressful to think about short AGI timelines, but this should obviously not be taken as evidence that timelines are long. If you made your current plans under 10 or 20 year timelines, they should probably be changed or accelerated in many ways at this point.

One upside of planning under short timelines is that the pieces are mostly all in place right now, and thus it’s much easier to plan than e.g. 10 years ahead. We have a somewhat good sense of what needs to be done to make AGI go well. Let's make it happen.

  1. ^

    I define AGI here as an AI system which is able to perform 95% of the remote labor that existed in 2022. I don’t think definitions matter that much anyways because once we reach AI R&D automation, basically every definition of AGI will be hit soon after (barring coordinated slowdowns or catastrophes).

  2. ^

    While they’re still using Slack that is. After strong government oversight, it’s unlikely that external human researchers will have any nontrivial sway over what happens on the inside.


Vasco Grilo🔸 @ 2024-12-24T00:39 (+10)

Hi Nikola.

I define AGI here as an AI system which is able to perform 95% of the remote labor that existed in 2022. I don’t think definitions matter that much anyways because once we reach AI R&D automation, basically every definition of AGI will be hit soon after (barring coordinated slowdowns or catastrophes).

What is your median date of superintelligent AI as defined by Metaculus? If sometime in 2027, I would be happy to bet it will not happen before the end of 2027.

Nikola @ 2024-12-24T16:36 (+7)

My median is around mid 2029, largely due to business-not-as-usual scenarios like treaties, pauses, sabotage, and war.

Vasco Grilo🔸 @ 2024-12-25T11:27 (+10)

Thanks for sharing. Are you open to a bet like the one I linked above, but with a resolution date of mid 2029? I should disclaim some have argued it would be better for people with your views to instead ask banks for loans (see comments in the post about my bet).

yanni kyriacos @ 2024-12-26T04:50 (+2)

If I had ten grand (or one) to throw around I’d be putting that into my org or donating it to an AI Safety org. Do you think there are ways that a bet could be more useful than a donation for AI Safety? I’m struggling to see them.

Vasco Grilo🔸 @ 2024-12-26T17:36 (+2)

Hi Yanni,

I propose bets like this to increase my donations to animal welfare interventions, as I do not think their marginal cost-effectiveness will go down that much over the next few years.

yanni kyriacos @ 2024-12-26T22:55 (+2)

Ah ok that makes sense :)

And you don’t mind taking money from ai safety causes to fund that? Or maybe you think that is a really good thing?

Vasco Grilo🔸 @ 2024-12-27T10:57 (+1)

I guess AI safety interventions are less cost-effective than GiveWell's top charities, whereas I estimate:

  • Broiler welfare and cage-free campaigns are 168 and 462 times as cost-effective as GiveWell’s top charities.
  • The Shrimp Welfare Project is 64.3 k as cost-effectivene as GiveWell’s top charities.
Nikola @ 2024-12-25T16:34 (+2)

I think I'll pass for now but I might change my mind later. As you said, I'm not sure if betting on ASI makes sense given all the uncertainty about whether we're even alive post-ASI, the value of money, property rights, and whether agreements are upheld. But thanks for offering, I think it's epistemically virtuous.

Also I think people working on AI safety should likely not go into debt for security clearance reasons.

Vasco Grilo🔸 @ 2025-01-04T07:45 (+2)

@Nikola[1], here is an alternative bet I am open to you may prefer. If, until the end of 2029, Metaculus' question about superintelligent AI:

  • Resolves with a date, I transfer to you 10 k 2025-January-$.
  • Does not resolve, you transfer to me 10 k 2025-January-$.
  • Resolves ambiguously, nothing happens.

The resolution date of the bet can be moved such that it would be good for you. I think the bet above would be neutral for you in terms of purchasing power if your median date of superintelligent AI as defined by Metaculus was the end of 2029, and the probability of me paying you if you win (p1) was the same as the probability of you paying me if I win (p2). Under your views, I think p2 is slightly higher than p1 because of higher extinction risk if you win than if I win. So it makes sense for you to move the resolution date of the bet a little bit forward to account for this. Your median date of superintelligent AI is mid 2029, which is 6 months before my proposed resolution date, so I think the bet above may already be good for you (under your views).

  1. ^

    I am tagging you because I clarified a little the bet.

huw @ 2024-12-22T23:20 (+9)

Heya, I’m not an AI guy anymore so I find these posts kinda tricky to wrap my head around. So I’m earnestly interested in understanding: If AGI is that close, surely the outcomes are completely overdetermined already? Or if they’re not, surely you only get to push the outcomes by at most 0.1% on the margins (which is meaningless if the outcome is extinction/not extinction)? Why do you feel like you have agency in this future?

Nikola @ 2024-12-22T23:44 (+15)

I get that it can be tricky to think about these things.

I don't think the outcomes are overdetermined - there are many research areas that can benefit a lot from additional effort, policy is high leverage and can absorb a lot more people, and advocacy is only starting and will grow enormously.

AGI being close possibly decreases tractability, but on the other hand increases neglectedness, as every additional person makes a larger relative increase in the total effort spent on AI safety.

The fact that it's about extinction increases, not decreases, the value of marginally shifting the needle. Working on AI safety saves thousands of present human lives on expectation.

Peter @ 2024-12-23T04:57 (+2)

This is a thoughtful post so it's unfortunate it hasn't gotten much engagement here. Do you have cruxes around the extent to which centralization is favorable or feasible? It seems like small models that could be run on a phone or laptop (~50GB) are becoming quite capable and decentralized training runs work for 10 billion parameter models which are close to that size range.  I don't know its exact size, but Gemini Flash 2.0 seems much better than I would have expected a model of that size to be in 2024. 

Nikola @ 2024-12-23T06:15 (+4)

I'm guessing that open weight models won't matter that much in the grand scheme of things - largely because once models start having capabilities which the government doesn't want bad actors to have, companies will be required to make sure bad actors don't get access to models (which includes not making the weights available to download). Also, the compute needed to train frontier models and the associated costs are increasing exponentially, meaning there will be fewer and fewer actors willing to spend money to make models they don't profit from.

Peter @ 2024-12-23T06:42 (+1)

So it seems like you're saying there are at least two conditions: 1) someone with enough resources would have to want to release a frontier model with open weights, maybe Meta or a very large coalition of the opensource community if distributed training continues to scale, 2) it would need at least enough dangerous capability mitigations like unlearning and tamper resistant weights or cloud inference monitoring, or be behind the frontier enough so governments don't try to stop it. Does that seem right? What do you think is the likely price range for AGI? 

I'm not sure the government is moving fast enough or interested in trying to lock down the labs too much given it might slow them down more than it increases their lead or they don't fully buy into risk arguments for now. I'm not sure what the key factors to watch here are. I expected reasoning systems next year, but it seems like even open weight ones were released this year that seem around o1 preview level just a few weeks after, indicating that multiple parties are pursuing similar lines of AI research somewhat independently. 

Nikola @ 2024-12-23T07:43 (+3)

Yup those conditions seem roughly right. I'd guess the cost to train will be somewhere between $30B and $3T. I'd also guess the government will be very willing to get involved once AI becomes a major consideration for national security (and there exist convincing demonstrations or common knowledge that this is true).