Facing up to the Price on Life

By Richard Y Chappell🔸 @ 2025-01-29T17:06 (+62)

This is a linkpost to https://www.goodthoughts.blog/p/facing-up-to-the-price-on-life

There’s something deeply wrong with the world, when the median US college graduate’s starting salary is a dozen times higher than the price to save another person’s entire life. The enduring presence of such low-hanging fruit reflects a basic societal failure to allocate resources in a way that reflects valuing those lives appropriately. (If you personally earn over $60k, and agree that your least-important $5k of personal spending is not nearly as important as a young child’s entire life, I’d encourage you to reallocate your budget accordingly and save someone’s life today. Then, if you’re happy with the results, consider taking the🔸10% Pledge to make it a regular thing. This should be the norm for anyone who is financially comfortable.)

It’s a tricky thing. If you really let yourself internalize this fact—that children are dying for want of $5000—it can be hard to think of anything else. How can life just go on as normal, when children are dying and we could easily prevent it? Why don’t more people treat this as the ongoing moral emergency that it is? Where is the urgency? Why aren’t most of the people around us doing anything?

Will you break through the barrier?

Psychological Defense 1: moral delusion

In order to live anything approximating a “normal life”, in these circumstances, we need to develop psychological defenses to block out the cacophony of global demands. And so we do. (Few are willing to be the sorts of radical altruists profiled in Strangers Drowning. I know I’m not!)

We learn to turn away, and ignore the needs of the world outside our local bubble. If people try to draw our attention back, we may even react with hostility: accusing them of being “preachy”, or “holier-than-thou”, or engaging in some kind of underhanded “guilt-tripping.” (How dare you break the social contract of mutually supporting each other’s delusions of decency, as we sip champagne while children starve?) We find—and elevate—other moral causes, preferably ones “closer to home”, that make fewer demands on our pocketbooks. We tell each other that it’s the personal touch that matters: being kind to our friends and colleagues; tipping workers generously; and pursuing every possible advantage or source of cultural enrichment for our children.

Of course, many such personal touches do indeed matter.[1] But are they all that matter? Do they matter more than distant children’s entire lives? Such a claim would hardly seem decent. Yet we all know that people say these sorts of things precisely in order to justify turning their backs on the global poor. It only works so long as we don’t draw attention to this very fact. (Hence the hostility to those who threaten this source of psychological comfort.)

Personally, I’m not a fan of dishonesty or rationalizations of this sort. I find it low-integrity. Alas, as mentioned, I also don’t want to become a radical altruist (I’m no moral saint!): I like living a comfortable life, getting to pursue the personal projects that I find engaging and rewarding, etc. My solution: don’t lie, compartmentalize.

2: Compartmentalization

We can’t live a normal life while fully appreciating the opportunity costs. And we can’t live an honest life while fully neglecting them. So, to combine honesty and normalcy, we have to fudge a bit. We have to acknowledge the reality of how our comfort trades off against others’ lives, without letting that daunting reality constantly swamp our everyday lives and personal priorities. Set aside some time and effort for dealing with it (as efficiently as possible), but then accept—as a compromise with human nature—that we’re always going to be a bit selfish, and so mentally bracket the depths of this moral disaster while we go about our daily business. (You don’t have to deny moral reality, you can just say: “Yes, I’ve set aside time to deal with that. That time isn’t now.”)

I don’t necessarily recommend this as the ideal response. It’s better to be a radical altruist. (Not in a stupid way that leads to immediate burnout, but in a strategic “doing the most good with your entire life plan” kind of way—something that surely requires plenty of self-care to successfully sustain.) But we don’t have to be—or pretend to be—ideal: imperfection is OK. And I think honest compartmentalization is much better than the moral delusion that most people engage in. Most importantly: it does a lot more good for the world (if you at least take the🔸10% Pledge or something similar). Plus it’s more intellectually honest—“better for your soul,” we might say.

Conclusion

My sense is that many people secretly fear that if they ever acknowledged the reality of moral tradeoffs—that children are dying because of their (in)actions[2]—they would feel compelled to become radical altruists.[3] I think it’s very important to appreciate that there is no such compulsion: you can acknowledge reality, do a bunch more good than almost anyone else, and still live an incredibly privileged—even self-indulgent—life. Really, it’s easy! Try it and see for yourself. (If enough people do, we should soon exhaust the low-hanging fruit and reach the point where we can’t so easily do so much good. That’s how things really ought to be: again, it’s messed up that opportunities for doing such massively disproportionate amounts of good are just lying there on the sidewalk, unused and seemingly unwanted.)

 

  1. ^

    Though I’m less sure about tipping—as an immigrant from the Antipodes, the practice still seems pretty weird to me.

  2. ^

    This may sometimes be worth it, and you should feel free to say so (I don’t mean to assume that saving kids from malaria is necessarily the best option around). But I don’t think most people could honestly claim to be using their resources to do more good than GiveWell’s top charities.

  3. ^

    Sigal Samuel at Vox expresses this sort of fear: “If someone could definitively prove what was morally optimal and what was not, what was white and what was black, we’d all feel compelled to choose the white.” Against the anti-optimization perspective advanced in her article, I argue that:

    (1) It’s better to do more good.
    (2) It’s OK to be imperfect (as we all are!).
    (3) We can often tell the difference (using good judgment with numbers: not blind deference to fallible calculations, but also not blind dismissal of quantitative considerations).
    (4) Given limited willpower, we should prioritize our attempts at moral improvement, be generally accepting of our (and others’) limits, and not sweat the small stuff.
    (5) None of (2) - (4) require denying (1).


John Huang @ 2025-01-30T22:04 (+8)

I mean one huge reason is logistics and uncertainty. 

First we must come to the knowledge that yes, children actually are dying, and this death can be prevented with $5000. How do we prove that? How does the average person obtain this information? Well, a charitable foundation says so. Or some famous celebrity claims it to be true. Or some study, which the vast majority of humanity has never read or even heard about, claims it to be true. 

Then we need to trust the charitable foundation to faithfully execute the plan to save the child. How do we know the plan will be faithfully executed? 

An effective altruist is committed to finding and evaluating these answers. The vast majority of humanity is not. So Effective Altruism has made a bunch of claims, but can't prove these claims in a 5 minute elevator pitch. 

In the end then you're just another charity asking for a leap of faith. Some people jump, others don't. If you're not asking for a leap of faith, you're asking for a huge mental investment to verify all the claims made.

Richard Y Chappell🔸 @ 2025-01-31T17:13 (+3)

I'm sorry, but those are just excuses. Nobody requires claims to be "proven" beyond all possible doubt before making decisions that are plausibly (but not definitely) better for themselves (like going to college). They only demand such proof to get out of making decisions that are plausibly better for others.

Unless you're a conspiracy theorist, you should probably think it more likely than not that reputable independent evaluators like GiveWell are legit. And then a >50% chance of saving lives for something on the order of ~$5000 is plainly sufficient to justify so acting. (Assuming that saving a life with certainty for ~$10k would obviously be choice-worthy.)

If one is unusually skeptical of life-saving interventions, the benefits of direct cash transfers (e.g. GiveDirectly) are basically undeniable. No "huge mental investment" or "leap of faith" required. (Unless by "leap of faith" you mean perfectly ordinary sorts of trust that go without saying in every other realm of life.)

John Huang @ 2025-01-31T18:46 (+3)

>Unless you're a conspiracy theorist, you should probably think it more likely than not that reputable independent evaluators like GiveWell are legit.

On what basis? Through thorough and methodical research? Or gut reaction? The research has a significant cost to it. Guts are notoriously unreliable. 

Clearly the answer is not to just "Trust Charities", because Effective Altruism claims that they are more effective than other charities. 

>(Unless by "leap of faith" you mean perfectly ordinary sorts of trust that go without saying in every other realm of life.)

In the normal capitalist economy, I go to a restaurant. I pay for the meal. The meal is immediately served to me. There is a clear connection of reciprocity. There is a clear indication that the requested service was provided. There is a clear avenue of evaluation. I just put the food in my mouth. That's where the trust comes from. You buy, receive, and evaluate the service through normal use and consumption. 

In charitable giving, there is no easy feedback. I give the money to a charity and the money essentially goes into a black void. I obtain no immediate feedback on whether the charity rendered is effective or not, because the services are not delivered to me but to somebody else. I cannot directly observe what the money is being used for. 

Richard Y Chappell🔸 @ 2025-01-31T22:24 (+3)

You're conflating "charity" and "charity evaluator". The whole point of independent evaluators is that other people can defer to their research. So yes, I think the answer is just "trust evaluators" (not "trust first-order charities"), the same way that someone wondering which supplements contain unsafe levels of lead should trust Consumer Reports.

If you are going to a priori refuse to trust research done by independent evaluators until you've personally vetted them for yourself, then you have made yourself incapable of benefiting from their efforts. Maybe there are low-trust societies where that's necessary. But you're going to miss out on a lot if you actually live in a high-trust society and just refuse to believe it.

Jason @ 2025-02-01T00:37 (+2)

But I don't think people blindly defer to evaluators in other life domains either -- or at least they shouldn't for major decisions. For instance, there are fraudulent university accreditation agencies, non-fraudulent ones with rather low standards, ones with standards that are pretty orthogonal to whether you'll get a good education, and so on.

I suggest that people more commonly rely on a social web of trust -- one strand might be: College X looks good in the US News rankings, and I trust the US News rankings because the school guidance counselor thought it reliable, and the guidance counselor's reputation in the broader school community is good. In reality, there are probably a couple of strands coming out from US News (e.g., my friends were talking about it) and from School X (e.g., I read about some successful alumni). So there's a broader web to justify the trust placed in the US News evaluation, buttressed by sources in which the decisionmaker already had some confidence. Of course, the guidance counselor could be incompetent, my friends probably are ill-informed, and most schools have at least a few successful alumni. But people don't have the time or energy to validate everything!

My guess is that for many people, GiveWell doesn't have the outgoing linkages that US News does in my example. And it has some anti-linkages -- e.g., one might be inclined to defer to Stanford professors, and of course one had some harsh things (unjustified in my opinion) to say about GiveWell. It comes up in the AI overview when I google'd "criticisms of Givewell," so fairly low-hanging fruit that would likely come up on modest due diligence. 

I'd also note that independent cannot be assumed and must be either taken on trust (probably through a web of trust) or sufficiently proven (which requires a fair amount of drilling).

My guess is that GiveWell is simply not enmeshed in John's web of trust the way it is in yours or mine. Making and sustaining a widely trusted brand is hard, so that's not surprising. 

Richard Y Chappell🔸 @ 2025-02-01T02:39 (+2)

I agree with your first couple of paragraphs. That's why my initial reply referred to "reputable independent evaluators like GiveWell".

Conspiracy theorists do, of course, have their own distinct (and degenerate) "webs of trust", which is why I also flagged that possibility. But mainstream academic opinion (not to mention the opinion of the community that's most invested in getting these details right, i.e. effective altruists) regards GiveWell as highly reputable.

I didn't get the sense from John's comment that he understands reasonable social trust of this sort. He offered a false dichotomy between "thorough and methodical research" and "gut reactions", and suggested that "trust comes from... [personally] evaluat[ing] the service through normal use and consumption." I think this is deeply misleading. (Note, for example, that "normal use and consumption" does not give you any indication of how much lead is in your turmeric, whether your medication risks birth defects if taken during pregnancy, etc etc. Social trust, esp. in reputable institutions, is absolutely ubiquitous in navigating the world.)

MatthewDahlhausen @ 2025-01-29T19:16 (+4)

Do you agree with Susan Wolf's claim in Moral Saints that we ought to consider non-moral values in deciding what we do, and those may be a valid reason to not given more to the worst off? I presume you've written about it before on your blog or in a paper.

A related question is: do you think the gap is greater between our actions and what we think we ought to do, or between what we think ought to do and what we ought to do in some realist meta-normative sense? Is the bigger issue that we lack moral knowledge, or that we don't live up to moral standards?

Richard Y Chappell🔸 @ 2025-01-29T20:01 (+4)

I'm open to the possibility that what's all things considered best might take into account other kinds of values beyond traditionally welfarist ones (e.g. Nietzschean perfectionism). But standard sorts of agent-relative reasons like Wolf adverts to (reasons to want your life in particular to be more well-rounded) strike me as valid excuses rather than valid justifications. It isn't really a better decision to do the more selfish thing, IMO.

Your second paragraph is hard to answer because different people have different moral beliefs, and (as I suggest in the OP) laxer moral beliefs often stem from motivated reasoning. So the two may be intertwined. But obviously my hope is that greater clarity of moral knowledge may help us to do more good even with limited moral motivation.

SummaryBot @ 2025-01-29T20:53 (+1)

Executive summary: The stark disparity between the cost of saving a life and everyday spending highlights a societal failure in resource allocation, and the author argues for honest acknowledgment of moral trade-offs alongside practical altruistic action, such as taking the 10% Pledge. 

Key points:

  1. The cost of saving a life is alarmingly low compared to everyday expenses, exposing a moral and systemic failure in how resources are allocated.
  2. Psychological defenses, like moral delusion, allow people to ignore distant suffering by rationalizing local generosity as sufficient.
  3. Compartmentalization offers an alternative approach—acknowledging moral trade-offs while setting aside dedicated efforts to do good without feeling compelled to extreme altruism.
  4. The author advocates for taking structured, impactful action, such as donating a portion of income, rather than rejecting moral obligations entirely.
  5. Many fear that acknowledging moral trade-offs would require radical self-sacrifice, but the author argues that meaningful impact is achievable without extreme personal cost.
  6. If enough people acted on these insights, the most urgent and cost-effective charitable opportunities would eventually be exhausted—an outcome that reflects a more just world.

 

 

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