Nuclear attack risk? Implications for personal decision-making

I'm not overly concerned with the news from this morning. In fact I expected them to raise the nuclear force readiness prior to or simultaneously to commencing the invasion, not now, which is expected going into a time of conflict/high tension from normal peacetime readiness. I had about a 5% chance this will escalate to a nuclear war going into it, and it's not much different now, certainly not above 10% (For context, my odds of escalation to full countervalue exchange in a US intervention in a Taiwan reunification campaign would be about 75%). Virtually all that probability is split between unfavorable developments dragging in NATO and accidents/miscalculation risk, which is elevated during tense times like this (something like, if the Russians had misinterpreted the attack submarine which entered their territorial waters last week as being a ballistic missile submarine sneaking up close to launch a first strike, or an early warning radar fluke/misidentification being taken seriously when it would've been dismissed during peacetime, either of which could've caused them to launch on warning).

Unintentional nuclear exchange will have no preceding signs, but unfavorable developments will, for example a NATO shootdown of a Russian plane or Russian fire straying over the border killing NATO troops which begins an escalation spiral. If we start seeing such incidents being reported, I would tell all my LW/EA friends to get the fuck out of NATO cities they're living in immediately.

Finally, here's a good thread on the heightened alert news. The US side still seems quite wary of nuclear escalation and hasn't even announced a reciprocal raising of DEFCON, which contributes to my relatively sanguine assessment of the situation at present. Keep in mind that this means I still have at least 5% on it, and that I don't feel comfortable living in a NATO (especially US) downtown core at ANY time, not just now, due to the significant and everpresent risk of accidental/sudden nuclear attack. For example, I'd really like it if MIRI would move out of Berkeley where they'd be instantly vaporized whenever nuclear war broke out, and now might be an even better time for them to take a temporary vacation outside the city (see my other comment in this thread), but I don't think the situation is far more alarming than usual just yet.

I am starting to worry that the possibility of Russia using conventional or perhaps more likely tactical nuclear weapons in the Ukraine conflict is real.   My concern is one largely based in this article by Francesca Giovannini : A hurting stalemate? The risks of nuclear weapon use in the Ukraine crisis. 

For Mr. Putin, any kind of losing the war with Ukraine seems like a non-option, given his domestic situation and the possibility that his regime could come to an end. 

The article outlines three assumptions that those who don't think Russia will use nuclear weapons make: "that Russia has a strong interest in not destroying Ukraine, because Putin wants to occupy it; that even though Putin is a thug, he is not a crazy enough thug to break a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons in war, a taboo that has held for 75 years; and that there are plenty of other options that the Russians can exercise in subduing Ukraine. "

However, I think all three of these assumptions are suspect. 

Regarding the first assumption, we have already seen Russia step up its attacks on civilian infrastructure in the last two days. For Putin, a victory of some kind (like regime change) is paramount, and the longer the invasion takes, with weapons and aid flowing to Ukrainian fighters, the harder that possibility becomes. 

Regarding the second assumption taboo, there are reasons to suspect Putin is willing to break the nuclear taboo. He has already threatened the possibility of not renewing treaties with the US to limit the number of nuclear weapons, he has sidelined many of his advisors, and he is an authoritarian clinging on to power and trying the restore Russia's status as a superpower. He may see all options as being on the table. 

Finally, with regard to the third assumption, it's true that Russia's conventional forces are vastly stronger than Ukraine's, but we have seen the fierce resistance of Ukrainian fighters, and a prolonged occupation would require many more troops. The use of a tactical nuclear weapon would test Ukraine's and NATO's resolve and signal his willingness to do whatever it takes to win the war.

I'm not an expert but it does seem highly alarming.

Also, see this 60 second advice article: https://nuclearadvice.org/

Some good reading for the bunker: Lewis Dartnell's The Knowledge: how to rebuild our world from scratch.

I think some form of this could be valuable, noting Sebastian's point that decreasing risk should be the main priority. It struck me reading the main article that the tendency for EAs to congregate to some extent geographically poses a challenge from a long-term perspective. Oxford, the community's beating heart, is uncomfortably close to London (the obvious civilian target) and Portsmouth (home of the Royal Navy, probably second-top priority military target), meaning a large fraction of the community would be wiped out in a nuclear war. It might be prudent for EAs who can work remotely to set up 'colonies' in places unlikely to be devastated by a nuclear exchange, to provide resilience. 

I appreciate the line of thought but it also seems important to focus on decreasing the risk and/or severity of nuclear war.

Nuclear winter is a very unlikely, highly conjunctive theory which requires many independent things to ALL happen perfectly, which are already individually suspect. E.g. that cities will all firestorm after being hit by airburst detonations (which itself relies on assumptions like adequate fuel loading per square meter, collapsed structures from the air blast not suffocating the oxygen, etc.), that this will burn in a way producing lots of black carbon, that this carbon will be nearly all lofted into the stratosphere, that this will block a high percentage of sunlight, that the carbon will persist there for many years, that it has to happen during the summer in warmer climates, etc.

Altogether, I think it's unlikely enough a possibility to be ignored in planning, which removes that utility of New Zealand, although it may still have value as a sheltered, unaffected place to escape the chaos and societal collapse of other countries following nuclear war.

I'm not sure if the bolthole idea is referring to an escape for EAs in particular or relocating as many people as possible in general, but the former is something I've considered which I think needs more discussion. Keeping valuable EAs (AI alignment researchers in particular) alive both through the initial exchange and the chaotic period which follows is extremely valuable to improve the world that follows a nuclear conflict, especially to improve the relative trajectories of AI alignment and capabilities by ensuring the built-up base of alignment knowledge & talent is not destroyed.

As such, people should be developing protocols to evacuate those researchers preemptively at times when nuclear war looks likely to ensure they're not killed in the initial detonations (or better yet, permanently relocate them to places with no or much lower risk of nuclear attack in the first place); as well as have preplanned long-term locations where they can ride out fallout and societal collapse/civil violence, stocked with enough food for years etc. I believe it's fine if such locations are in the US given no nuclear winter, and it would be difficult to travel to somewhere like NZ in the post-attack environment anyway.

It should be mentioned that the border to NZ will be closed to most people (due to covid) until July, with a few exceptions opening up around March  https://covid19.govt.nz/international-travel/travel-to-new-zealand/when-new-zealand-borders-open/

• Skilled workers earning at least 1.5x the median wage may be eligible to be granted an ‘other critical worker’ border exception.
• [critical services include]
  • food production and its supply chain
  • key public services like health and emergency services
  • lifeline utilities such as power and water supplies
  • transport
  • critical financial services
  • news media
  • social welfare
  • human and animal health and welfare. (EA-relevant?)

There is a theory that Putin is terminally ill and could therefore be open to taking the rest of the world with him. I don't know how much weight to put on it.

Miscalibration might cut both ways... 

On one hand, It seems quite plausible for forecasts like this to usually be underconfident about the likelihood of the null event, but on the other hand recent events should probably have substantially increased forecasters' entropy for questions around geopolitical events in the next few days and weeks. 

Metaculus is (as of posting this comment) on 5% for Nuclear Detonation Fatality By 2024 .

Does anyone know where to buy potassium iodide tablets? I can't find any seller which is not out-of-stock and which works on the internet