New Research: Climate Mitigation is Overlooked by EA

By Dan Stein @ 2026-08-18T14:48 (+48)

Disclaimer: This blog post focuses on a new piece of research from Rethink Priorities. I was not involved with the funding or execution of this research, and therefore write this piece merely as a consumer. However, I am the Executive Director of Giving Green and a board member of Rethink Priorities, and acknowledge that these affiliations may bias my interpretation of the work. 

 

TL;DR

 

Introduction

Over time, there have been numerous discussions on how climate change mitigation should rank as an EA cause. For instance, in his influential Climate Change and Longtermism, John Halsted writes, “In my view, climate change is one of the most important problems in the world, but other problems, including engineered viruses, advanced artificial intelligence and nuclear war, are more pressing on the margin because they are so neglected.”

That being said, many donors have a near-to-medium term view and therefore may be directly comparing donating to climate mitigation (for instance, through the Giving Green Fund or the Founder’s Pledge Climate Fund) to global health and development (GHD) options such as giving through Coefficient Giving’s Global Health and Wellbeing (GHW) Fund or Givewell’s (GW) Top Charities Fund. Yet until recently (to my knowledge) there was no quantitative work doing this cross-cause comparison. 

That’s why I was delighted to see new research from Rethink Priorities (Clare and Vargas 2026) that seeks to quantitatively compare the cost-effectiveness of GHW interventions to climate mitigation, specifically by comparing the benchmark of 1-2 dollars/tCO2e sought by the climate funds to the “funding bar” of Coefficient Giving/Givewell. The crux of this comparison lies in the calculation of the “social cost of carbon” (SCC), or the amount of societal damage caused by a ton of CO2 emissions. The findings: climate donations are competitive with GHD, and are more cost-effective than GHD under certain sets of assumptions. This is particularly true now that Coefficient Giving has lowered their funding bar by roughly half, due to “growing expectations of future giving” (presumably from AI Lab employees). 

 

How to compare climate to GHW: Use SROI

When comparing climate mitigation to GHW, Rethink’s approach is to calculate the social return on investment (SROI) of climate funds, and compare it to CG’s funding bar. For CG, their “funding bar” is expressed explicitly as an SROI. In the Rethink paper, CG’s funding bar is stated as 2000x, but CG recently updated it to 1000x. In other words, they expect that for every dollar granted, they will get (in expectation) 1000 dollars worth of value (which could come from saving lives, improving health, improving impact, etc.) Since CG attempts to fund GW until their funding bars are equal, we can assume 1000x to be a good approximation of GW’s marginal funding SROI. 

To calculate the SROI of climate interventions, the authors use two parameters:

  1. Cost effectiveness of climate philanthropy, expressed as the amount of USD required to reduce a tonne of emissions ($/tCO2e)
  2. Social Cost of Carbon (SCC), which is the total cost (including lives lost, economic damage, etc), expressed in $/tCO2e

The ratio of (2) to (1) gives the amount of societal benefit from spending a dollar on climate philanthropy. For instance, if philanthropic opportunities can be bought for $1/tonne, and the SCC is $200/tonne, then the SROI of this investment is 200x. 

To estimate the cost-effectiveness of climate philanthropy, Rethink takes the approach of drawing from a distribution spanning  $.50 and $3.50 (cost per tonne of CO2e avoided). Cost-effectiveness estimates in this space are highly uncertain, but Giving Green’s modeling suggests that opportunities exist at around $1/tonne, and we use this as a rough benchmark when assessing grantmaking opportunities. The prospect of $1/tonne also surfaced in Rethink’s research, as quoted below:

“In our conversations and research, multiple individuals expressed confidence in being able to find interventions at a cost of roughly $1/tonne or even lower. However, because we maintain significant uncertainty about how realistically these opportunities might scale, we wanted to apply a reasonable, perhaps slightly conservative, lean to our abatement costs.”

 

The Key Parameter: Social Cost of Carbon

The most difficult parameter in making this comparison is the social cost of carbon, which is hotly debated in the climate literature. Therefore, Rethink makes the comparison for different assumptions of SCC. 

One issue with using SCCs from the literature is that they rely on assumptions that are standard in the economics literature, such as a modest discount rate. However, these assumptions invalidate a direct comparison to the CG bar. In my mind, the biggest contribution of the Rethink paper is the recalculation of a prominent SCC using “an EA valuation framework” that makes it comparable to the CG bar. This involves changing four main inputs into the SCC:

These adjustments, along with some other minor ones, make a meaningful difference. A frequently-cited SCC from Rennert el at (2022) is $185/tonne, which was used by the Biden EPA. However, the adjustments of applying the “EA Evaluation Framework” cause the SCC to rise to over $2000/tonne.

Main Results

The paper’s results explore how the comparison between climate and GHD shifts under a number of assumptions, of which I highlight a couple that I think are most relevant. The first is a simple comparison of the CG bar to the “mainstream” adjusted SCC. This mainstream SCC ($2000/ton, discussed above) accounts for the impact of lives lost, as well as economic impacts from agriculture and sea-level rise. I reproduce this comparison from the Rethink paper below:

 

Adopted from Clare and Vargas (2026). New CG Bar added to graph

Under the old CG bar, CG investments were roughly 2.5x more impactful than climate investments, though the error bars overlapped. However, the new CG bar is very close to the climate SROI, well within the estimates’ range of uncertainty. 

A primary criticism of “mainstream” approaches to SCC such as Rennert et al. (2022) is that they assume exogenous growth and then model economic damages as a percentage of GDP. In other words, the models allow climate to affect levels of GDP, but not growth. This “levels not growth” assumption of standard models has been strongly criticized by many prominent economists, who find it unbelievable that the major societal shifts brought on by climate change will not affect growth. 

If we do assume that climate change affects growth, this massively increases SCC. The Rethink paper surveys the literature on economic growth effects of SCC and finds quite a range of estimates, so they present a few outcomes, shown below. Adopted from Clare and Vargas (2026). New CG Bar added to graph

With economic growth (as well as a modest 25% adjustment for “tipping points”) added to the SCC, climate interventions now easily beat the CG bar. Depending on the assumptions around growth, climate is roughly 2-5x more impactful than CG’s new bar. 

 

Why might this be wrong?

The comparison of climate to GHW is based on quite a few assumptions, which may drive incorrect answers. Critically, both key parameters—cost-effectiveness of climate philanthropy and the social cost of carbon—come with great uncertainty. 

At Giving Green, we do a lot of modeling of the cost-effectiveness of climate donation opportunities, and I will be the first to admit that the modeling is very uncertain. Most of the organizations we support have long theories of change involving policy and/or technology change. Therefore, the models come with many assumptions that could be incorrect. However, we have seen many opportunities that pencil out in the $1/tonne range, making us feel more comfortable that this is an achievable threshold. 

Additionally, the social cost of carbon is a difficult-to-calculate parameter that comes with substantial uncertainty. Complex systems, such as behavior of ice melt from glaciers, and the earth’s changing reflectivity, could have large human effects that are not incorporated in current damage models. Additionally, it is very hard to predict how human adaptation and technological progress will allow society to adapt to changing temperatures. 

Given these fundamental uncertainties in climate philanthropy, donating to climate is definitely more uncertain than donating to GiveWell Top Charities. It is probably more uncertain than donating to GW “all grants” or CG’s GHW fund, but this is less clear because some of the grants made from these funds also rely on uncertain theories of change, such as policy change. 

 

Conclusion

Many in the EA community tend to believe that donations to climate organizations are not competitive with other near- or medium-termist opportunities. This new research shows that is not clearly the case, and that climate appears competitive with EA-aligned GHD options such as Givewell. 

In the near term, cause areas traditionally favored by EA (such as GHD) are expecting a flood of money, which will likely saturate grantmakers, and reduce the marginal cost-effectiveness of additional contributions. We see this dynamic already, with CG recently lowering its funding bar by half (from an SROI of 2000x to 1000x). 

This dynamic is unlikely to affect climate grantmaking in the same way. Many conversations have led me to believe that climate is not a priority cause area among most early AI lab employees, meaning it is unlikely that the anticipated upcoming wave of philanthropy will saturate climate funds the same way it will other causes. Therefore, I think climate will remain cost-effective on the margin, and over time will become relatively more attractive in comparison with other favored EA causes. 

As of now, EA-aligned climate grantmaking is far from saturated. Over at Giving Green, we have built up a 6-person research and grantmaking function, and are on track to make ~34 million in new grants from the Giving Green Fund in 2026. Much of this grantmaking is fueled by a large gift we received in 2025, and we are on track to meet our goal of completely regranting this large gift, as well as all other assets currently in our fund, by the end of 2026. This leaves us with plenty of grantmaking capacity for late 2026 and 2027- we think at our current staffing levels we could make 100M of grants in 2027, and could also increase staffing to create more capacity. 


jackva @ 2026-08-18T19:39 (+16)

(I manage the FP Climate Fund, so my incentives run counter to my take). I hadn't had the time to examine this paper in detail, but I am quite skeptical of this Rethink Priorities paper. I think it is quite easy to string together assumptions that yield a high social cost of carbon, but I wouldn't treat this as an unbiased estimate.

For example, if I understand this correctly based on your description, they use the Rennert et al (2022) paper to derive the SCC from which they make adjustments.

https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-05224-9/figures/1

The assumptions of that paper are clearly extremely pessimistic, probably by 2022 standards, but definitely by what would now be the consensus view.

For example, they assume close to 20/Gt annual emissions in 2100 as their median scenario and high emissions continue well into the 23rd century. In other words, we are more than a 100 years late in achieving net-zero in their median scenario despite all technological trendlines rendering this quite implausible.

Combining this with a low discount rate will give a high SCC, but I don't think this is close to a reasonable baseline for what a median expectation should be. (Obviously good to have a low discount rate from an EA perspective, but this requires that the modeling of the future is a bit more careful). Essentially, this means that most marginal carbon reduction modeled for the SCC will happen in worlds where this is implausibly valuable thereby inflating the SCC value.

This alone probably leads to an overestimate of the SCC of a factor of 5x or more and this came up from looking at the paper for 5min.

Dan Stein @ 2026-08-19T19:41 (+2)

Thanks for the comments. 

A couple of quick responses.

  1. Regardless of what any individual thinks about the underpinning assumptions and methodology, the Rennert et al (2022) SCC is widely used and “mainstream”. 

It is certainly true that there is high uncertainty around the SCC, and a wide range of estimates. But the Rennert et al (2022) paper is just about as mainstream, “blue-chips” of an estimate as you are going to get, and therefore I think is a reasonable anchor for the Rethink analysis.  

A few data points showing how mainstream is Rennert et al (2022) analysis (and the underlying GIVE model plus the probabilistic assumptions on emissions pathways that underpin it):

  • This work was used heavily by the  Biden administration’s EPA as part of a comprehensive update of their internal social cost of carbon, and their estimate was ultimately adopted. (detailed EPA report here.)
  • The German Environment Agency uses a very similar approach built on Rennert, but applies some different assumptions (lower discount rate, equity weighting), and comes to an estimate of 345 EUR (assuming 1% pure rate of time preference)
  • From Opus 5.0: “There is no single consensus number, but there is a fairly clear structure to where the field has landed. Short version: ~$190/tCO₂ (2020 USD, 2% near-term discount rate) is the de facto reference value”

Of course this doesn’t mean the paper or its estimated SCC  is “right”, but I do think it’s a highly defensible reference SCC for Rethink’s analysis. As correctly mentioned by Vasco, there are numerous critiques of the Rennert paper, arguing that a lower SCC is more appropriate. But there are also influential critiques in the other direction. In the post I discussed how incorporating effects on economic growth can lead to much higher SCCs. For instance, a recent paper by Bilal and Kanzig (2026) argue for a much higher SCC of $1200 (even assuming a 2% discount rate). 

  1. Despite being “mainstream”, is Rennert et al (2022) unreasonably pessimistic about future outcomes?

If I understand correctly, Rennert et al (2022) use distributions of future states of emissions based on Rafferty et at (2017), which use historical data to assign probability distributions to the different IPCC emissions scenarios. If historical trends are not good predictors of future ones (for instance, due to rapid technological advancement), these estimates could be off. 

Personally I’d agree with Johannes that the Rennert future emissions distributions feel pessimistic, but I would not agree with the modifiers "clearly extremely". I think their mean estimate would fall within one standard deviation from the mean in my personal distribution.

But in any case, one could re-do the analysis with more optimistic distributions. Resources for the Future has a handy calculator that allows one to re-calculate the SCC with different models and different parameters. If we switch from the emissions distribution in Rennert (RFF-SP) and instead move to the more optimistic SSP-2 (which is the closest option to my beliefs, though I’d still be a bit more optimistic), SCC falls by 15%, from 185 to 158. Unfortunately the calculator does not allow us to move the discount rate to zero, which is really what we need to test the sensitivity of the Rethink estimate to different emissions futures. One would need actually re-run the models to calculate exactly, but a 5x wedge feels quite off to me.

Vasco Grilo🔸 @ 2026-08-19T16:06 (+2)

Hi Johannes.

For example, if I understand this correctly based on your description, they use the Rennert et al (2022) paper to derive the SCC from which they make adjustments.

https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-05224-9/figures/1

The assumptions of that paper are clearly extremely pessimistic, probably by 2022 standards, but definitely by what would now be the consensus view.

I agree. Here is a critique of Rennert et al. 2022 by David Friedman.

Alex Novikau @ 2026-08-18T19:06 (+9)

I am not sure the comparison stays entirely symmetric once endogenous growth is added on the climate side. If climate damage can permanently change the growth path, then at least some GHD interventions should also have effects on growth through health, schooling, productivity, fertility and so on.

I assume some of that is already captured in the GiveWell/Coefficient models, but probably not the same kind of macro second-order effects. Since climate seems to become competitive mainly when these more uncertain effects are included, I would be interested in how much this matters.

Tom Vargas @ 2026-08-18T19:36 (+3)

Fair point Alex. We mostly interrogated the climate side of things, and in that sense the work itself is asymmetric. GW does incorporate second order effects into some of its CEAs, but I guess the larger question is whether or not there is any such large multiplier to apply to some GHD interventions for some amount of time. My quick reading of the literature there is simply that there isn't strong evidence on the direction of growth effects for GHD, whereas the estimates we found on the climate side were at least consistent in direction (though I may be wrong here).

Ulf Graf 🔹 @ 2026-08-18T16:56 (+2)

14% of all coral reefs died between 2009 and 2018. At 1.5°C temperature rise, 99% of coral reefs are expected to be dead by 2050. 44% (48 million km2) of the world’s habitable land is used for agriculture. 33% of all soil is already degraded and 90% is estimated to be degraded by 2050. Vertebrate populations have declined by 73 % between 1970 and 2020 and insect populations have seen a 75% decline in biomass. The United Kingdom says ecological collapse is the biggest threat for food security. All these things and many other climate related things might affect billions of people.

alexis schoenlaub @ 2026-08-18T16:29 (+2)

Thank you for your post. I agree that climate change is underfunded in EA, and I’m happy to see Rethink Priorities updating its models. I also wonder whether GHD is somewhat overfunded by EA, especially since some interventions can accelerate economic development in ways that increase environmental pressures if they are not accompanied by systemic change. Climate change will itself have major consequences for global health and development. I’m particularly skeptical of approaches that rely on producing mosquito nets, medicines, etc. in Europe and shipping them elsewhere rather than strengthening local capacity and resilience.

 

On another note, I came to the Forum because I want to raise money for climate action during a demonstration in Geneva. Having been part of the EA community for a few years, I naturally looked at Effective Altruism Switzerland’s climate fund, but something didn’t quite click for me. I had a similar feeling when looking at Giving Green: it seems quite focused on technological solutions. I’m therefore looking for another organization to support, although I’m open to changing my mind. I’ve been a fan of GFI for years, for example, but I’m not convinced that plant-based meat and dairy analogues are a sufficient answer to climate adaptation in agriculture—they are only one part of the solution. What about the campaign beans is how? I also looked briefly at Deploy/US (though obviously nowhere near as deeply as Giving Green), and I have the impression that its European counterpart, The Shift Project, takes a somewhat more grounded approach. More broadly, I sometimes worry that focusing on decarbonizing aviation, cement, heating, or meat production can lead us to optimize the existing system rather than question what kind of system we actually want. I would like to see more resilient communities, sufficient food in both quantity and quality—fruits, vegetables, cereals, legumes, and perhaps some meat, including from agricultural residues or as part of agroecosystem management—and accessible healthcare. I’m not opposed to technological solutions when they are genuinely the most cost-effective way to achieve these goals, but I would value more diversification in climate philanthropy. Otherwise, what happens if we successfully decarbonize cement, aviation, and energy in 20 years, but then discover that transforming the underlying food, health, democratic, and social systems still takes another 30–50 years? I worry that we could end up having optimized the technologies around the existing system without having invested enough in making the system itself more resilient.

Thank you for your time,

Alexis Schoenlaub

aschoenlaub@hotmail.fr

nietup @ 2026-08-19T15:38 (+1)

More EA Near/Medium-Termist Money Should be Flowing to Climate Change Mitigation

MaxSJC @ 2026-08-19T13:55 (+1)

Climate feedback loops remain a potential factor to greatly amplify the effect from human emission.