AMA: Andy Weber (U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense from 2009-2014)

It is one somewhat useful tool to try to assess and potentially mitigate risks. With nuclear weapons the data on use and near misses are extremely limited. Untested theories can be helpful, but we can’t rely on them too much because the stakes of getting it wrong are so high.

AI is increasing the BW threat in at least two ways. It is expanding “recipe” access to more players, like the internet did. For the last thirty years there were terrorist groups with intent to deploy BW, but they were either interdicted or not very capable. AI will expand access to capability. The second concern is that sophisticated actors will use AI-enabled bioengineering to make enhanced pathogens. I’m pleased that responsible AI companies are working feverishly to put in place guardrails to mitigate both of these risks. To answer your specific question, I would not be at all surprised if in 15 years a global biological catastrophe is AI-enabled.

ASB, Maybe I’ll try answering both questions at once, because the first one is too ridiculous to answer directly without being snotty. While some of my work during a thirty year public service career has received attention, it is very important to understand that anything we achieved was the result of teamwork. Indeed, one of the most satisfying aspects of public service is that it is a team sport. So my advice is don’t have personal ambition, but rather focus on mission ambition. Together we can accomplish big things to make the world a safer place. One of the aspects I love about the EA community is how supportive and kind people are to one another.

Physical protection works, so this would be our best defense until medical countermeasures are developed and distributed. We need better and cheaper masks and suits, and they should be widely available in a crisis.

Definitely net-positive. It is actually shocking how little on this is included in the education of life scientists. We teach bio-ethics but rarely biosecurity.

Some of our amazing former Council on Strategic Risks Ending Bioweapons Fellows wrote this outstanding paper debunking common misconceptions about biological weapons: https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Common-Misconceptions-About-Biological-Weapons_BRIEFER-12_2020_12_7.pdf

Lately it is quite high on the national security agenda. The upcoming UK summit demonstrates the importance some leaders attach to it. A lot of this resides in the private sector, so governments will have to work in close partnership with private stakeholders to take meaningful action. I don’t know enough to answer your specific “kill switch” question.

David, Great to hear from you, and I look forward to your other forty nine questions the next time we meet in person. Communicable biological weapons represent an existential or omnicidal risk. Non-communicable biological weapons could also be catastrophic. In my opinion several million dead is catastrophic, even if it is not existential. Thankfully, much that we can do to prevent the worst case will also reduce the lesser included case. Also, some non-communicable BW agents like antibiotic and vaccine resistant anthrax are more probable. So if there is an “EA consensus” to ignore toxins and anthrax, I would disagree.

"Specifically, do you see a justification for considering the former global catastrophic risks?"

Which is the "former", communicable or non-communicable?

I’m deeply concerned about all of these. Thankfully, only a handful of countries are actively pursuing biological weapons. That said, the few countries that have offensive BW programs are very dangerous. Given the expanding access to knowledge and BW capabilities, I worry also worry a lot about terrorist groups and lone wolves. They represent a very difficult intelligence and law enforcement challenge.

Unilateral action should be the last resort. The Iraqi BW program was successfully destroyed by 1996, and it was never reconstituted. Rolf Ekeus wrote a very good book on UNSCOM’s successful efforts. The only place today that such unilateral action would even be considered is Syria’s rump chemical weapons program. The only other countries that have biological and chemical weapons also have nuclear weapons, so unilateral action would not be considered unless it were part of a larger direct conflict.
Our approach should be to do everything we can to strengthen the norm against developing and using biological and chemical weapons. Thankfully very few countries pursue these prohibited weapons. I am also a strong believer in deterrence by denial, and the Council on Strategic Risks has written about this. We and our Allies and partners should have a visible, greatly expanded biodefense effort to deter bio attacks and deny our adversaries the mass casualty effects of such weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense spends less than 1/5 of one percent of its budget on chemical and biological defense. This needs to change. The recent Biodefense Posture Review is a good step in the right direction.

That’s part of the job - there are few easy policy decisions. I would give NATO and the Biden Administration high marks for lowering the risk of nuclear war AND supporting Ukraine and Taiwan. When Putin and his minions were making reckless and dangerous nuclear threats, we were calm and did not change our nuclear posture. This approach seems to be working.

Joel, I’m highly confident Iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon. The U.S. and Israel have exquisite intelligence on the Iranian nuclear program, which has been a high priority for decades. Should Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei change his policy and pursue a nuclear weapon, we would know.

During my time in government I was involved in convincing the Israeli government not to launch a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. I was also involved in developing the military capabilities needed if Iran did opt for nuclear weapons, and these capabilities are now mature. The Iranian leadership understands well that pursuit of nuclear weapons would provoke an Israeli military strike.

The above said, Trump’s decision to pull the U.S. out of the JCPOA to pursue a better deal was a stupid and reckless failure. Undoing that damage should be a high priority for our diplomats.

There are a few examples of states giving up nuclear weapons or the pursuit of them. South Africa gave them up. Sweden, Argentina, and Brazil gave up seeking them. I do believe that we can make serious steps towards the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. It will take determination, energy, and creativity to get us there. That is one reason I am so excited that so many young leaders have shown a renewed interest in nuclear weapons issues.

Removing nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine was an extremely important success. Had Ukraine tried to retain nuclear weapons, I believe an armed conflict with Russia would have broken out in the 1990’s.
There are many other things that could have been done to prevent Russia’s unprovoked, illegal attack on Ukraine. Ukraine keeping nuclear weapons is not one of them.

1. International organizations and treaties have a vital role in preventing BioWeapons development. We need to redouble our efforts to strengthen the BWC. There also needs to be stronger global governance to prevent accidents and misuse. Kazakhstan President Tokayev has proposed establishing and International Biosafety Agency. This and other similar concepts to strengthen biosecurity should be actively promoted.

2. We definitely need to do more on the security side of this equation.

The Council on Strategic Risks just released a report on tactical nuclear weapons: https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2023/08/01/ending-tactical-nuclear-weapons/

The INF Treaty and the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives were two historic examples of eliminating so-called tactical nuclear weapons. We need to build on these lessons and make capping and eliminating tactical nuclear weapons the highest arms control priority.

I believe significant changes to U.S. nuclear weapons policy and posture only occur when the President personally intervenes. This was also true of the U.S. decision to eliminate its biological weapons program in 1969. President Nixon demanded it.