EA's Image Problem

Just a few remarks about 80,000 Hours.

Our intention is to eventually provide career advice to all graduates.

However, for the next 1-2 years, it seems far better for us to focus on especially talented graduates in their 20s. For startups the usual advice is to start by having strong appeal in a small market, and this audience is the best fit for us (it's where we've had most success in the past, where we have the strongest advantage over existing advice, and where we can have the largest impact with a small number of users).

Unfortunately, this has the negative side effect of making effective altruism look more elitist, and I don't see any easy way to avoid that.

Another thing to bear in mind is that 2/3 of the sections of our guide apply to everyone: https://80000hours.org/career-guide/basics/ https://80000hours.org/career-guide/how-to-choose/

We also have this article, which we link to in the intro material: https://80000hours.org/articles/how-to-make-a-difference-in-any-career/

The main bit that's targeted to talented students are the career profiles: https://80000hours.org/career-guide/profiles/ And the career recommender which is based on them. Even here, we'd like to expand these to include a wider range of careers within the next 6 months.

If you're talking to someone at 80,000 Hours who might be put off by it seeming overly elitist, stress the general principles ('learn the basics' section), approach to choosing a career ('make a decision' tool) and broad pathways to impact (building skills, etg, direct work, advocacy), since these apply to everyone.

I see a tension at the heart of your piece. On the one hand, you say you "want EA to change the attitudes of society as a whole". But you seem willing to backpedal on the goal of changing societal attitudes as soon as you encounter any resistance. Yes, society as a whole believes that "it's the thought that counts" and that you should "do something you're passionate about". These are the sort of attitudes we're trying to change. If EA is watered down to the point where everyone can agree with it, it won't mean anything anymore. (Indeed, we've been criticized from the other direction for being too watered down already: one economist called EA "vacuous".)

You criticize EAs for believing that "their movement is correct and more important than all others". But the implicit premise of your post is that EA should seek to improve its image in order to increase its influence and membership, almost necessarily at the expense of other movements. The implication being that EA is more correct and/or important than those other movements.

I'm skeptical of your implicit premise. I think that EA should play to its strengths and not try to be everything to everyone. We're passionate about doing the most good, not passionate about problems that affect ourselves and our friends. We focus on evidence and reason, which sometimes comes across as cold-hearted (arguably due to cultural conditioning). Many of us are privileged and see EA as a way to give back. If someone doesn't like any of this, they are more than welcome to borrow from EA as a philosophy--but EA as a movement may not be a good fit for them, and we should be honest and upfront about that.

I'm tempted to say this post is itself a symptom of the "EA is the last social movement we'll ever need" type arrogance it criticizes :P

My vision of EA is not EA being the last social movement we ever need. It's a vision of getting a bunch of smart, wealthy, influential critical thinkers in the same room together, trying to figure out what the world's most important and neglected problems are and how they can most effectively be solved. If it's not a candidate for one of the world's most important and neglected problems, we should leave it to some other movement, and I don't think we need to apologize for that.

I'm not even sure I want EA to add more smart, wealthy, influential critical thinkers. EA has already captured a lot of mindshare and I'm in favor of intellectual diversity broadly construed. Additionally, EAs have (correctly in my view) pointed out that expanding the EA movement is not an evidence-based intervention... for example, for all we know most people who have recently pledged to donate 10% will burn out in a few years.

Final note: I'm doubtful that we can successfully split the "doing good" and "being a good person" semantic hair. And even if it was possible, I'm doubtful that it's a good idea. As you suggest, I think we should set up incentives so the way to gain status in the EA movement is to do a lot of good, not have the appearance of being a good person.

Great post! To address Rich-Person Morality, I wonder if it would make sense to support political movements to advocate for increased foreign aid for effective programs in the developing world. Government agencies like USAID and DFID are already some of the largest donors to many effective programs (e.g. malaria control and deworming). Yet at the same time, the USAID budget is less than one percent of federal budget, so there seems like there is room to give more.

One nice thing about this type of advocacy is that it would be inclusive of people of all income levels, since we can all vote for candidates who would support increasing the foreign aid budget for effective programs.

Examples of this type of advocacy include the ONE Campaign and the END7 campaign.

We could also advocate for less restrictive immigration laws and government policies to support reduced meat consumption. We could even create a "EA" legislative scorecard to endorse candidates running for public office.

[Update: edited post to reflect Owen's feedback that we should be supporting existing efforts]

Very interesting ... with respect to the distinction between being a good person and doing good, I tend to think we underestimate the value of doing good. The archetypal example is Bill Gates, who built a $100 million house but is still (in Peter Singer's view, at least) the largest effective altruist of all time.

I do think the wealth have a greater moral imperative to give money, but I also think we tend to undervalue people's practical impact in favor of their level of martyrdom. If I'm at risk of dying of malaria, I'd much rather have Gates come to my rescue than someone making $50,000 and giving half to charity. I certainly don't think that makes Gates morally better in any way, but he has made life decisions that have increased his giving ability (not to mention being exceptionally fortunate to be born into an affluent, wealthy family at the dawn of the personal computer age, of course).

I generally think we (EAs, but everyone else, too) could use a dose of humility in acknowledging that no one really knows the best way to change the world. We're all guessing, and there is value in other approaches as well (such as making zillions, buying a yacht, and giving some to charity; running for office or supporting a political campaign, spending your time bringing food to your elderly neighbor across the street, building a socially responsible company that hires thousands of people, etc.).

Hey David, Thanks very much for this article. Definitely gives us plenty of food for thought. I think the point about distinguishing judgements about characters from ones about actions is particularly interesting. I think in many ways one of the things effective altruism is often trying to do is get away from judgements about characters, and instead focus on judgements about actions.

Thanks for your suggestions on the pledge. This is definitely something we’ve considered in the past. One important thing to say is that the Pledge should absolutely not be used to distinguish ‘good people’. As you say, giving 10% of your income is just more viable for some people than others. I think it’s really important that we move away from judging people as good or bad in general. You might say a similar thing about vegnism: it might be tempting to classify people as good or bad based on whether they’re vegn or not; but some people have health reasons for not being veg*n, some people believe they can do more good by not being, etc. At the same time, one thing that GWWC is trying to highlight is how well off people in many rich countries are compared to people globally, even if they aren’t well off by their country’s standards. The fact that someone on the median wage in the UK is in the top 5% of incomes worldwide (ppp adjusted) does indicate that many of us are better off than we might have thought, which might make us feel more able to donate than we previously had. But how able people are to donate will depend on their individual circumstances and feelings, so it doesn’t seem sensible for us to pick a cut-off. I also think the simplicity of the message is pretty crucial. A large part of what GWWC is trying to achieve is to show people that donating 10% of one’s income isn’t an unachievably high bar, but something that many people do. The power of this comes from being able to say ‘we are a community of x people who all actually give 10% of their wages’ – that is much more powerful than saying ‘we are a community of people who would give 10% of our wage if they were above £x’. This is all the more so because we actually even get objections along the lines of ‘but giving away 10% is easier for people less wealthy than me, because it means they’re giving away less’ (my parents are sympathetic to that line of reasoning – they’re members, but they wouldn’t be if they earned more).

I’m not convinced that your characterisation of the ethical views of effective altruists is accurate, and I think it could be harmful to simplify in the way that you do. While it’s true that quite a few of the people who started the effective altruism movement put more credence in welfarist consequentialism than in many other normative theories, that has two caveats: There was a big selection effect at the start – Toby Ord and Will MacAskill met through studying Ethics, so it’s unsurprising they would have similar views. Also, many of the people I imagine you’re talking about not only have a great deal of moral uncertainty, they’re actually leaders in the field of moral uncertainty. That both means that it’s incorrect to ascribe ‘narrow consequentialism’ to them, and that the description of being arrogant and dogmatic is less true of them than most other ethicists. The view many of the people around at the start of the GWWC would probably be most accurately described as something like ‘welfarist with constraints’. In some cases (like me), that means having the most credence in some form of scalar utilitarianism, some in prioritarianism, some in a deontological framework incorporating human rights (plus a bunch of uncertainty). Because deontological theories put huge weight on not breaking rights, while consequentialism would typically only imply on the balance of probabilities it was somewhat better to break them in extreme cases, the credences I described should be summarised as welfarism with constraints. In other cases (like Andreas Mogensen, one of the other founders of GWWC and Assistant Director up until last month) people placed most credence in some form of deontology, which none-the-less holds consequences in terms of welfarism to be important.

I definitely agree with the idea we should be trying to make our writing accessible and clear, rather than technical. I would guess that’s something most people already have as an ideal, just not one they always manage to achieve (that’s definitely how I feel!). I also think it’s crucial we recognise the importance of causes like fighting discrimination, and in particular the benefit we get from people who have experienced it speaking up, despite it being difficult (and often frustratingly repetitive) to do so. (Sorry this ended up rather long, speaking of writing succintly!)

This is a really well-thought out piece, and some excellent suggestions here!

I am especially worried about the points about being "cold-hearted," "rationalist," and "smug" - I agree that it's how the movement comes off across to others. This is what I found myself in my project of spreading rational thinking, including about philanthropy and thus Effective Altruism, to a broad audience.

Here's what I found helpful in my own outreach efforts to non-EAs.

First, to focus much more on speaking to people's emotions rather than their cognition. Non-EAs usually give because of the pull of their heartstrings, not because of raw data on QALYs. So we as EAs need to do a much better job of using stories and emotions to convey the benefits of Effective Altruism. We should tell stories about the children saved from malaria, of the benefits people gained from GiveDirectly, etc. Then, we should support these stories by numbers and metrics. This will definitely help reduce the image of us as smug, arrogant, and cold-hearted.

Second, we need to be much more intentional - dare I say "rational" - about our communication to non-EAs. We need to develop guidelines for how to communicate to people who are not intuitively rational about their donations. We need to remember that we suffer from a typical mind fallacy, in that most EAs are much more data-driven than the typical person. Moreover, after we got into the EA movement, we forget how weird it looks from the outside - we suffer from the curse of knowledge.

Third, we need to focus much more efforts on developing skills on outreach and communication (this is why I am trying to fill the gap here with my own project). We haven't done nearly enough research or experimentation on how to grow the movement most effectively through communicating effectively to outsiders. Investing resources in this area would be a very low-hanging fruit with very high returns, I think. If anyone is interested in learning more about my experience here and wants to talk about collaborating, my email is gleb@intentionalinsights.org

Excellent article. The simple language worked well for me and some of the points he raised had been in my mind. Thanks for writing such a thoughtful piece.

Thanks, nice post. I agree with most of this. I'd particularly like to see more of an emphasis on the distinction between the goodness of acts and of people.

There are a couple of your recommendations which I think have significant costs, which I'll point out. That's not to say that I think it would be wrong to move in the direction of the recommendation, but I think it may well be right to disregard some reasonable proportion of the time. I'm also arguing in defence of things that I will sometimes do: I like to think this is mostly that I do them because I think they are reasonable, but there may be an element of my defending them because I behave that way.

-Refrain from posting things that assume that consequentialism is true & Terminology from economics and philosophy is often used even when it’s not strictly needed. This makes the conversation inaccessible to many. [...] Never use a foreign phrase, a scientific word, or a jargon word if you can think of an everyday English equivalent.

In both cases I see the the argument that these can be alienating, and that's a cost which it's important to keep in mind. But both can be useful for faster progress and dialogue when exploring ideas. Thinking just of consequences gives a focus to conversation; technical terms often give you a precision that it can be hard to achieve with everyday terms. So I think it's reasonable to keep these tools available, but generally for private conversations where you know the people who might be reading.

I think this is an excellent post. The point about unnecessary terminology from philosophy and economics is certainly one I've thought about before, and I like the suggestion about following Orwell's rules.

On the use of the term rational, I think it can be used in different ways. If we're celebrating Effective Altruism as a movement which proceeds from the assumption that reason and evidence should be used to put our moral beliefs into action, then I think the use of the term is fine, and indeed is one of the movement's strong points which will attract people to it.

But, if we're saying something along the lines of "effective altruists are rational because they're donating to AMF (or other popular charities among EAs)", then I suppose it could be interpreted as saying we have all the answers already. So, perhaps it should be stressed that the fact that effective altruism is based on the principle that we should engage in rational inquiry does not always mean that effective altruists will be rational. From what I've read, the EA movement seems to be good at welcoming criticism, but it may not seem that way to others not associated with the movement.

On the point about narrow consequentialism, I agree with using other arguments, such as the drowning child argument, to counter this accusation. It may be harder to counter it with people you personally know, though: my non-EA friends know I assign a lot of weight to utilitarianism, so even if I am discussing it without using narrow consequentialist arguments, they may still see it through the lens of narrow consequentialism because they'll associate EA with me and therefore with utilitarianism. Hopefully, though, by focusing on the arguments for EA that don't rely on consequentialism, this association can be dealt with.

Starting a long debate about moral philosophy would be relevant here, but also out of place, so I'll refrain myself.

But what do you mean by "Refrain from posting things that assume that consequentialism is true"? That its best to refrain from posting things that assume that values like e.g. justice aren't ends-in-themselves, or refrain from posting things that assume that consequences and their quantity are important?

If it is something more like the latter, I would ask myself if this would be to pursue the goal of popularity by diminishing a part of the movement that is among the main foundations of what makes it valuable.

Would you e.g. suggest for people to refrain from referring to scope insensitivity like its a cognitive bias?: http://lesswrong.com/lw/hw/scope_insensitivity/, http://lesswrong.com/lw/hx/one_life_against_the_world/

Lots of things are philosophically controversial. The question of whether slavery is a bad thing has renowned philosophers on both sides. I haven't looked much into it much, but I suppose that the anti-slavery movement at some point was going against the majority opinion of the "experts" with nothing speaking in favour of their view except specific arguments concerning the issue in question. I haven't given it a lot of thought, but I suppose that if being uncontroversial among "experts" is a good measure of reasonableness, then even today we should be more open to the possible importance of acting in accordance with theistic holy texts.

Don't get me wrong: I am aware of that there is a pluralism of ethical theories that motivate EAs. I appreciate people motivated by other ethical assumptions than my own and their good deeds, and wouldn't want EA to be considered a narrow-consequentialism-only movement where non-consequentialists aren't welcomed. That being said: While parts of EAs appeal are independent of the moral theory I agree with, other parts that I consider important are very much not. It's hard to think of any more fundamental assumptions in the reasoning behind e.g. why far future concerns are important.

While I try to make decisions that aren't deontologically outrageous, and make sense both from the perspective of "broad" and "not-so-broad" utilitarianism, it's clearly the case that if Immanuel Kant is right then a lot of the EA-relevant decisions I make are pointless. While Kantians who care about EA should be welcomed into the movement, and that not relying on only consequentialist reasoning when its not necessary, I think that encouraging all EAs to speak as if Kant and other philosophers with a complete disregard for consequentialism might be correct would be asking a lot.

While avoiding unnecessary alienation is good, I observe that the way of a movement to succeed isn't always to cave in (although it sometimes may be). Proponents of evolutionary theory don't concede that some species may be created by God, people arguing in favour of vaccines don't concede that the scientific method may be useless, etc.

I also honestly think that the word rational is a good description of the approach EA takes to doing good in a way that clearly isn't the case for many other ways of going about it (by most reasonable definitions of the word). The effective altruism way of going about things IS far superior to a lot of alternatives, and while tactfulness is a good thing, avoiding to say things that implies that this is the case does not seem to me like a good strategy. At least not in all cases.

You raise some interesting perspectives about an important topic, and my comment only concerns a fraction of your post. Many of the suggestions you raise seem good and wouldn't come at the expense of anything important :) I'm not at all certain about any of the strategic concerns that I comment upon here, so take it only as my vague and possibly wrong perspective.

The first talk of this video feels relevant: https://vimeo.com/136877104

Thanks for posting this Tom, it resonates with some concerns I've had recently. In my opinion, EA does need somewhat of an image review, if not overhaul. A few comments:

"It’s much easier for someone who hasn’t been depressed, or devoted a lot of time to helping a depressed friend, to accept that it’s better to give to AMF than to charities that help the mentally ill."

If I can offer a personal experience, I was deeply depressed earlier in my life, and have lost family members to cancer. Interestingly, this motivated me to objectively do the most good more than focussing on these causes specifically, before I even discovered EA. I had experienced 'suffering', and became fixated with reducing 'suffering'. I wonder why this is, as I know this isn't the case for many. I hope this doesn't come across as smug, I'm just thinking out loud.

"Adjust the pledge so that, below a certain income threshold, one can give less than 10%"

I prefer Peter Singer's calculator which gives a % based off of your income. And I always tell people, "Try to do a little more good than you did last year." So telling people to start with a small and easily achievable goal like donating 1% to an effective charity and increasing that every year might be effective.

"EAs are committed narrow consequentialists even when the vast majority of experts dismiss it."

By this do you mean they propose a broader consequentialism including justice etc.? I confess I didn't know this, and would appreciate some further reading or philosophers who say so.